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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Sarah M. Johnson appeals from the district court's order dismissing her 
petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
In the early morning hours of September 2, 2003, Johnson shot and killed 
her mother, Diane, and her father, Alan with a .264 rifle that belonged to Mel 
Speegle who rented a guest house above the Johnson's garage but who was not 
home at the time of the murders. (Trial Tr.1, Vol. IV, pp.2291-2309, pp.2685-
2729.); State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970,972, 188 P.3d 912, 914 (2008). The 
evidence proving Johnson was involved2 in the murder of her parents was 
overwhelming. 
Johnson was angry with her parents because they disapproved of her 
relationship with Bruno Santos, a nineteen-year-old illegal immigrant, who they 
planned on reporting to law enforcement the day they were murdered. (Trial Tr., 
Vol. IV, p.2505, L.14 - p.2509, L.6; Vol. V, p.3337, Ls.7-18; p.3342, L.13 - p.3343, 
L.6; p.3345, Ls.4-18; p.3357, L.15 - p.3359, L.6.) Shortly after the murders, 
Johnson fled to a neighbor's house, where she reported that both her parents had 
1 The transcript from Johnson's criminal case was admitted as Exhibit 2 at the 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (Tr., p.4; Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) All 
references to the transcript will be designated as "Trial Tr." along with the 
relevant volume and page numbers. 
2 The jury was instructed that Johnson could be found guilty of first-degree 
murder regardless of whether she pulled the trigger or aided and abetted another 
in the murders. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912. 
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been shot. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1512, L.8-p.1519, L.5; p.1554, L.5-p.1555, L.25; 
p.1583, L.18 - p.1586, L.10.) Although Johnson denied any involvement, she gave 
several different accounts of what she allegedly was doing, what she saw, and what 
she heard just prior to and after the murders. Johnson initially claimed she heard a 
gunshot while she was in her room asleep, that she sat up in bed, then heard a 
second shot, went to her parents' bedroom door, called for her mother, then fled the 
house. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1519, L.6 - p.1521, L.7; p.1558, Ls.3-19.) She stated 
she had not seen anything, however. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1521, Ls.3-7.) The 
second time she told the story, shortly thereafter, her report differed: she stated she 
heard her father in the shower before the shots. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1528, Ls.3-18.) 
(See also Tr., Vol. VI, p.3696, L.6 - p.3701, L.15; p.3739, L.24 - p.3742, L.22 
(another version of events told by Johnson).) 
Upon being asked the first time by police what had happened, just a few 
minutes later, she tried to reconcile these statements, stating that her father starting 
the shower initially woke her up, but she went back to sleep and was re-awakened 
again by the first shot. (TriaITr., Vol. III, p.1811, L.21-p.1813, L.6; p. 2099, L.17-
p.2103, L.21.) In this statement she also for the first time claimed she had opened 
the door of the master bedroom before fleeing the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1850, 
Ls.1-23.) She later told a friend that she had immediately fled the house upon 
hearing the shots. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3297, L.22 - p.3298, L.22.) She told this 
friend's mother that, after hearing a shot and going to her parent's closed bedroom 
door, she heard arguing, called out to her mother, and then fled the house. (Trial 
Tr., Vol. VI, p.3529, L.10 - p.3530, L.15.) (See also Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2106, L.7-
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p.2112, L.23 (version of events Johnson gave police a few hours later).) Later that 
day, Johnson told her brother that she woke up upon hearing the first shot, went to 
her parents' closed door and called out for them, then heard the second shot and 
fled the house. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pA545, L.16 - pA548, L.12.) 
Johnson was interviewed again the day after the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.2424, L.16 - p.2426, L.7.) She stated she woke up when she heard the shower 
come on, and then a few minutes later heard a shot. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2426, L.8 
- p.2428, LA.) She got out of bed, went through her bathroom into the guest 
bedroom, out into the hall, and to the door of the master bedroom. (Trial Tr., Vol. 
IV, p.2428, L.5 - p.2429, L.9.) She stated her bedroom door was either closed or 
open only a crack. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2429, Ls.10-13.) In this interview, Johnson 
claimed she heard the second shot while standing outside the master bedroom 
door, but that the doors were open because her parents propped it open with a 
pillow, and Johnson again stated she did not see or hear anything indicating a 
struggle. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2429, L.14 - p.2432, L.1.) About 25 days after the 
murders Sarah told another version of events. She told a relative that the first shot 
woke her up; she heard a second shot, ran to her parents' bedroom, and saw blood 
on the walls and floor. (Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.3684, L.22 - p.3690, L.12.) 
Johnson's inconsistent statements regarding what she saw, did, and heard 
around the time of the murders were significant in relation to other evidence. For 
example, several of the people who saw Johnson the morning of the murders noted 
her hair and appearance were not consistent with her claim that she was asleep in 
bed when the murders occurred. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1545, L.20 - p.1547, L.18; 
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p.1559, L.14 - p.1560, L.11; p.1818, L.19 - p.1819, L.19; p.2520, L.15 - p.2521, 
L.23.) Johnson's claim that her parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door had 
been closed was also inconsistent with the presence of Diane's blood and brain 
matter in Johnson's own bedroom across the hallway and part of Diane's skull 
being in the hallway outside the master bedroom. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1619, L.20-
p.1620, L.10; p.1637, Ls.5-15; p.1655, L.2 - p.1657, L.9; p.1868, Ls.2-18; p.2019, 
L.24 - p.2020, L.18; p.2020, L.24 - p.2022, L.3; p.2121, L.7 - p.2124, LA; Vol. V, 
p.3122, L.11 - p.3123, L.20.) In addition, Diane's blood was found on the socks 
Johnson was wearing the morning of the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1755, L.8 -
p.1759, L.8; Vol. V, p.3120, L.21 - p.3122, L.13; p.3423, Ls.8-14; p.3475, L.19-
p.3476, L.3.) Johnson also had a bruise on her left shoulder that was consistent 
with a recent impact, such as shotgun recoil.3 (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2248, L.3 -
p.2250, L.9; p.2317, L.6 - p.2318, L. 18.) 
During the interview that took place the day after the murder, Johnson 
admitted owning a pink bathrobe (Tr., Vol. IV, p.2436, Ls.7-18), admitted that a 
right-handed leather glove found in the trash in her room belonged to her mother 
and was usually in the car (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2036, L.1 - p.2037, L.6; Vol. IV, 
p.2436, L.19 - p.2437, L.1; Vol. VI, p.3596, L.20 - p.3598, L.1), and claimed there 
should not have been any bullets in her room (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2437, Ls.2-17). 
However, unspent cartridges of the type used in the murders were found in her 
bedroom. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2033, L.11 - p.2034, L.18.) On them was Diane's 
3 Johnson claimed the bruises came from falling and hitting a table at Santos' 
house when she stayed there two days before the murder. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.2444, Ls.7-15.) 
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blood. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3122, L.11 - p.3123, L.24.) In addition, the police found 
the spent casings to rounds that killed Alan and Diane in the garage and the master 
bedroom (still in the rifle). (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1840, L.15 - p.1842, L.12; p.1843, 
L.24 - p.944, L.15; p.1954, L.11 - p.1956, L.21; p.2051, L.3 - p.2053, L.8; Vol. V, 
p.2912, L.6 - p.2954, L.16.) Also significant was evidence law enforcement found 
in a trash can set out on the street for collection the morning of the murders: one 
latex glove and one left-hand leather glove, which matched the glove found in 
Johnson's bedroom, wrapped in the pink bathrobe that belonged to Johnson. (Trial 
Tr., Vol. III, p.1672, L.16 - p.1673, L.17; p.1826, L.16 - p.1832, L.14; p.1893, L.19 
- p.1902, L.17; Vol. VI, p.4566, L.16 - p.4568, L.25.) Inside the robe were paint 
chips that matched paint on the shirt Johnson was wearing the morning of the 
murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1755, L.8 - p.1758, L.6; Vol. VI, p.3574, L.1 - p.3587, 
L.21.) Testing revealed Johnson's DNA was present inside the latex glove (Trial 
Tr., Vol. V, p. 3106, L.5 - p.2114, L.1), and the robe itself tested positive for blood 
and DNA from Diane (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3114, L.2 - p.3117, L.11; p.3434, L.11 -
p.3459, L.3; p.3473, L.13 - p.3475, L.2), DNA possibly from Alan (Trial Tr., Vol. V, 
p.3434, L.11 - p.3459, L.3), gun shot residue (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3229, L.15 -
p.3238, L.20), and tissue from Diane (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3446, L.19 - p.3448, L.18; 
p.3454, L.16 - p.3455, L.23). The blood on the robe was consistent with the 
shooter having worn it, backwards, during the shooting. (Trial Tr., vol. VI, p.4194, 
L.5-p.4211, L.21.) 
, With respect to Johnson's access to the murder weapon, the weapon had 
been hidden in a closet in the guesthouse used by Speegle. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
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p.2418, L.8 - p.2419, L.22; p.2702, L.3 - p.2706, L.1.) Speegle testified at trial 
that (1) he kept the rifle in his closet along with three other guns (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.2702, L.8 - p.2703, L.2); (2) the guns were not locked (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2703, 
Ls.3-8); (3) he saw the guns the weekend prior to the murders at which time the 
scope was still on the .264 rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2704, L.6 - p.2706, L.8); (4) 
he had only fired the .264 three times, ten years prior (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2706, 
LS.17 -21); (5) he cleaned the .264 in 1993 (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2708, Ls.2-9); and 
(6) he has no idea how many people touched the .264 rifle, but his wife and a 
friend helped him move into the guesthouse (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2707, Ls.11-22). 
Speegle also testified that Johnson had access to his apartment, that 
Johnson knew he would be gone the weekend before the murders, and that the 
.264 rifle, as well as his other guns and ammunition, were in the closet when 
Johnson cleaned his apartment and stayed there with friends. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.2693, LS.17 -20, p.2694, L.25 - p.2696, L.6, p.2715, Ls.12-25.) In fact, Johnson 
had a key to the guesthouse and had been in there several times, including the 
days immediately preceding the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2037, L.7 - p.2038, 
L.6; Vol. IV, p.2257, L.7 - p.2258, L.10; p.2437, L.18 - p.2439, L.23; p.2688, L.25-
p.2690, L.6; p.2715, L.12 - p.2716, L.6; Vol. V, p.3274, Ls.11-25; p.3285, L.6 -
p.3293, L.7; p.3335, L.14 - p.3336, L.22.) 
When law enforcement was investigating the murders, they found the scope 
from the murder weapon still in the guesthouse on the bed, and officers initially at 
the scene observed footprints in the dew on the lawn going to and from the 
Johnson home and the guesthouse, which was an apartment above the detached 
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garage on the Johnson property. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1733, L.20 - p.1738, L.25, 
p.1842, L.8 - p.1843, L.3; p.2056, L.2 - p.2057, L.22; Vol. IV, p.2706, Ls.2-16, 
p.2685, L.12 - p.2686, L.25.) A nine-millimeter handgun magazine from the 
guesthouse was also found in Johnson's room. (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.2038, L.7 -
p.2040, L.10.) A nine-millimeter handgun matching the magazine was in a gun 
safe in the guesthouse (Trial Tr., Vol. III, L.7 - p.2062, L.12), and a .22 rifle from the 
guesthouse closet was also found in the garage (Trial Tr., Vol. III, p.1728, L.20 -
p.1731, L.20; p.2047, L.18 - p.2050, L.18; Vol. IV, p.2708, L.13 - p.2709, L.14). 
Johnson had asked her parents for a key to the family's gun safe two days before 
the murders. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3336, Ls.10-22.) 
The state charged Johnson with, and a jury convicted her of two counts of 
first-degree murder and a firearm enhancement. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 972, 188 
P.3d at 914. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Johnson's convictions. 
Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Johnson pursued post-conviction relief. Johnson, through counsel, 
ultimately filed a "Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief' raising 
numerous claims. (R., Vol. 3, pp.801-825.) Included among Johnson's claims 
c 
were allegations that (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit testimony from 
Robert Kerchusky, the defense's fingerprint expert, that the unidentified 
fingerprints found on the scope that was removed from the murder weapon and 
an insert from a box of ammunition for the murder weapon were "fresh" (R., Vol. 
3, pp.815-817), and (2) that newly discovered evidence entitled Johnson to a 
new trial. (R., Vol. 3, pp.823-824.) The newly discovered evidence claim was 
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based on the fact that, at the time of Johnson's trial, there were unidentified 
prints on the murder weapon and an insert from the ammunition box. A standard 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System check of previously unidentified 
prints revealed a match between those prints and prints provided by Christopher 
Hill in connection with an arrest for driving under the influence. (Tr., p.652, LS.2-
21; p.654, Ls.2-22; see also p.659, Ls.11-14.) 
The state filed a motion for summary dismissal (R, Vol. 3, pp.835-836; R, 
Vol.4, pp.837-898), which was granted in part, and denied in part (R, Vol. 6, 
pp.1413-1414, 1424-1445-1450).4 The court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
on six claims including Johnson's claims regarding counsel's alleged failure to 
inquire about the "freshness" of the unidentified prints and the newly discovered 
evidence claim. (R, Vol. 6, pp.1449-1450.) 
Both Speegle and Hill testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 
(Tr., pp.699-724, 726-739.) Speegle testified that he moved into the guest house 
on the Johnson property in "approximately 2002." (Tr., p.699, Ls.10-15.) Hill 
helped Speegle move from his "ranch house" into the Johnson guest house. (Tr., 
p.700, Ls.18-20, p.703, Ls.20-23.) Hill was a "good friend" of Speegle's and had 
been a caretaker at Speegle's ranch house where he had access to Speegle's 
.264 rifle. (Tr., p.704, Ls.1-4, 11-13, p.724, Ls.10-20.) To Speegle's knowledge, 
however, Hill did not have access to the Johnson guest house. (Tr., p.704, LS.8-
10.) 
4 Johnson also withdrew some of her claims and conceded the state was entitled 
to summary dismissal on other claims. (R, Vol. 6, pp.1413, 1445-1446.) 
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Hill confirmed that he was the caretaker for Speegle's ranch and that he 
helped Speegle move "a few things" into the Johnson guest house. (Tr., p.726, 
Ls.14-17, p.727, Ls.5-12.) Hill also confirmed that he did not have access to the 
guest house. (Tr., p.727, Ls.13-16.) Hill specifically denied any involvement in 
the murders of Alan and Diane, noting he did not even hear about the murders 
until about one week after they occurred because he had been camping. (Tr., 
p.728, Ls.5-20.) In explaining why his prints would be on the .264 rifle, other 
than having possibly left them when he helped Mr. Speegle move, Hill testified 
that, during the springtime in 2000, while he was caretaking at Speegle's ranch, 
he "took it out, tried to sight it," and shot it "six or seven times" using Speegle's 
ammunition. (Tr., p.728, L.21 - p.729, L.7; see also p.729, L.24 - p.731, L.21.) 
After the evidentiary hearing, and submission of post-trial briefing, the 
district court denied relief on the remainder of Johnson's claims. (R., Vol. 7, 
pp.1724-19275.) Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., Vol. 7, pp.1931-
1933.) 
5 For the Court's convenience, a copy of the district court's lengthy, thorough, 
and well-reasoned Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto 
as Appendix A. 
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ISSUES 
Contrary to I.A.R. 35(a)(4). Johnson provides no statement of the issues 
on appeal. Based on Johnson's arguments, the state phrases the issues on 
appeal as: 
1. Has Johnson failed to establish the district court erred in denying relief on 
her claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective in presenting fingerprint 
evidence? 
2. Has Johnson failed to establish the district court erred in denying her 
motion for a new trial based upon the newly discovered fingerprint evidence 
since such evidence was not material and would not likely produce an acquittal? 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Johnson Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying Relief On 
Her Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective In Relation To The Presentation Of 
Fingerprint Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Johnson contends the district court erred in denying relief on her claim 
that counsel was ineffective in relation to the presentation of fingerprint evidence 
at trial. (Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), pp.31-47.) A review of 
the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing and at trial supports the 
district court's conclusion that Johnson was not entitled to relief on this claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of 
law and fact. A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which her claim is based. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 
(1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof 
is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 
965 (Ct. App. 1990). Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be 
given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Rueth v. 
State, 103 Idaho 74,644 P.2d 1333 (1982). 
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C. Johnson Has Failed To Establish She Met Her Burden Of Proving Counsel 
Was Ineffective In Presenting Fingerprint Evidence At Trial 
Johnson contends her trial attorney's "performance was deficient for failing 
to elicit testimony from Bob Kerchusky that the prints found on the murder 
weapon, and its scope and ammunition were fresh prints and were not deposited 
at the time the State argued at trial" and that "[h]is failure to do so prejudiced" 
her. (Appellant's Brief, p.31.) The district court correctly concluded Johnson is 
not entitled to relief on this claim 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's 
performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson 
v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a 
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon 
v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174,1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 
Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). The United States Supreme 
Court has recently reiterated: 
Surmounting Stricklands high bar is never an easy task. An 
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules 
of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and 
12 
so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, 
lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very 
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
A review of the applicable law, the record on appeal, and the underlying 
criminal record, supports the district court's conclusion that Johnson failed to 
meet her burden of proving she was entitled to post-conviction relief on her claim 
that counsel was ineffective in examining the defense's fingerprint expert at trial. 
At trial, Tina Walthall, a fingerprint examiner with the Idaho State Police, 
testified that she received fingerprint cards from Johnson, Bruno Santos, Alan 
Johnson, Diane Johnson, Mel Speegle, Janet Sylten (a cleaning lady), Russell 
Nuxoll (Sylten's boyfriend), and Robin Lehat (Sylten's employer). (Trial Tr., Vol. 
V, p.3009, Ls.16-20.) Walthall used these print cards to compare with the prints 
lifted from the crime scene.6 (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3018, Ls.2-5.) After those 
comparisons, certain fingerprints taken from the crime scene remained 
unidentified, including fingerprints found on the stock of the rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. V, 
p.3027, L.20 - p.3028, L.22), the scope from the rifle (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3042, 
L.22 - p.3044, L.2), and two boxes of .264 shells (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3049, L.8 -
p.3052, L.3). A search of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System prior to 
trial using three of the unidentified prints also revealed no matches to any of the 
unidentified fingerprints. (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3045, L.1 - p.3046, L.10, p.3053, 
Ls. 5-11, p. 3066, Ls. 1-13.) 
6 None of the fingerprints taken from the crime scene matched Santos or Sylten. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3020, Ls.15-24.) 
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Walthall also repeatedly testified there is no way to date a fingerprint to 
determine when it was left (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3028, Ls.13-17, p.3044, Ls.22-25, 
p.3052, Ls.22-25, p.3058, L.19 - p.3062, L.11, p.3073, Ls.5-15.) Walthall 
specifically stated: (1) "many, many years can pass and you might still find 
usable fingerprints on" paper or cardboard (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3060, Ls.10-11); 
(2) she has discovered prints off of nonporous surfaces more than a year later 
(Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3061, LsA-5); (3) one would expect to find fingerprints more 
than a year old if nothing happened between "when they were deposited and 
when [they were] processed" (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3061, Ls.20-25); and (4) "it is 
probable that a fingerprint would last up to and exceeding a year, providing there 
has been nothing to damage that fingerprint in the interim," which is true even on 
a nonporous surface (Trial Tr., Vol. V, p.3062, Ls.3-6). 
Johnson called Robert Kerchusky at trial to rebut Walthall's testimony. 
(See generally Trial Tr., Vol. VII, pp.5044-5132.) With respect to the length of 
time a fingerprint will remain on a gun, Kerchusky testified: "Well, we can't be 
sure how long they're going to last. The only thing, as far as a gun is concerned, 
pretty much on my experience, after a year, they're just about gone, as far as I'm 
concerned." (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5070, Ls.9-12; see also Tr., Vol. V, p.5128, 
L.22 - p.5129, L.1.) Kerchusky, however, acknowledged that aging offingerprints 
on nonporous surfaces is a controversial subject because "there's so many 
variables as far as weather, where it's located. I mean there's so many things 
that come into it, there's no way in the world anybody could write any article on 
it." (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5107, Ls.3-6.) Kerchusky also acknowledged that 
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fingerprints on porous surfaces can last for years and that there are some "rare" 
instances where a latent print that was over a year old could be found on a 
nonporous surface. (Trial Tr., Vol. VII, p.5130, Ls.8-16.) Kerchusky further 
testified that although he could not determine how old a fingerprint is, he "still 
would have an opinion as far as whether it's a fresh print or not." (Trial Tr., Vol. 
VII, p.5108, Ls.1-6.) 
While trial counsel may not have used the word "fresh" in his examination 
of Kerchusky, the issue regarding the "freshness" of the unidentified prints was 
clearly covered. The type of language counsel uses in asking questions is 
certainly well within counsel's decision-making authority. The district court 
correctly concluded as much. (R., Vol. 7, pp.1916-1917.) 
Johnson claims the district court erred in finding trial counsel's 
performance regarding his examination of Kerchusky objectively reasonable, 
arguing the district court's conclusion is not supported by the record because, 
she asserts, counsel "did not even recall having a discussion about freshness" 
and that "[a]1I he knew was that 'it would be very unlikely that [the prints] would 
last beyond a year.'" (Appellant's Brief, p.46.) It is Johnson's argument that is 
not supported by the record. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, trial 
counsel testified: 
Q: And do you recall Mr. Kerchusky telling you that, in his 
opinion, the latent but unidentified prints on the -- on the rifle and on 
the scope and on the inserts and on the ammunition were fresh 
prints? 
A: I recall that -- well, you'd have to define "fresh prints." 
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Q: You don't recall Mr. Kerchusky's lesson about what fresh 
prints are? 
A: Well, Mr. Kerchusky and I discussed how long fingerprints 
would stay in existence; and my recollection was that they would --
it would be very unlikely that they would last as much as a year, 
because a fingerprint is, unless it's some kind of, been etched into 
some metal as a result of corrosive bodily fluids, is -- are bodily 
fluids that will eventually evaporate. And my recollection was that it 
would be very unlikely that they would last beyond a year. 
Q: And for example, someone saying that they had touched one 
of those objects a year or more before was just not possible, 
according to Mr. Kerchusky's opinion; correct? 
A: Very, very unlikely. I don't think he said it would be 
impossible but that it would be very unlikely that a fingerprint would 
last longer than a year. And to the extent that's what you mean by 
fresh, less than a year old, yeah, I do recall that. 
Q: And do you recall that Mr. Kerchusky shared with you some 
of his, the basis of his opinion, that is, that there are certain 
environmental conditions which may impact whether a print could 
last on an object for over a year or whether an object that had been 
subjected to certain environmental conditions may lose latent prints 
during a shorter period of time if subjected to those conditions? Do 
you remember that? 
A: Yeah, in general I remember that. 
(Tr., pAD?, L.12 - pA09, L.2 (bold omitted).) 
Contrary to Johnson's claim, trial counsel remembered discussing 
Kerchusky's position with him and counsel, in fact, elicited testimony from 
Kerchusky at trial that the unidentified prints could not be more than a year old 
or, in other words, that the prints were what Kerchusky would call "fresh." 
Johnson's fixation on using the word "fresh" and her implied insistence that the 
word must be used in order to communicate the idea that the prints were 
deposited recently does not demonstrate ignorance by trial counsel in either his 
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trial performance or his recollection of conversations he had with Kerchusky prior 
to trial. 
Even if trial counsel should have used the word "fresh" in his questioning 
of Kerchusky, Johnson cannot establish she was prejudiced by counsel's failure 
to do so. Trial counsel clearly highlighted for the jury the theory that whoever left 
the unidentified fingerprints on the gun and ammunition was the person who 
murdered Alan and Diane. (Supplemental Trial Tr., p.272, Ls.7-25.) Also 
referring to the claims as being "fresh" would not have made a difference in the 
jury's evaluation of Johnson's guilt, particularly in light of the overwhelming 
evidence against Johnson, which is discussed in further detail in Section II.B., 
Johnson has failed to establish error in the district court's conclusion that 
she is not entitled to relief on her claim that counsel was ineffective in eliciting 
testimony from the defense's fingerprint expert. 
II. 
Johnson Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying Relief On 
Her Newly Discovered Evidence Claim 
A. Introduction 
Johnson argues the district court erred in denying relief on her newly 
discovered evidence claim. (Appellant's Brief, pp.47-65.) Johnson is incorrect. 
While the post-trial identification of Hill's fingerprints as a match to the previously 
unidentified prints on the rifle, scope and ammunition inserts constitutes newly 
discovered evidence that could not have been found through the exercise of 
diligence, the evidence is not material and would not likely produce an acquittal. 
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The record supports the district court's conclusion that Johnson is not entitled to 
a new trial on this basis. 
B. The Identification Of Hill's Fingerprints Is Not Material And Would Not 
Likely Produce An Acquittal 
In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho 
Supreme Court articulated a four-part test a defendant must satisfy in order to be 
entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. That test requires 
a defendant to show that the evidence offered (1) is "newly discovered and was 
unknown to the defendant at the time of trial"; (2) is material, not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of diligence on the part of the 
defendant. kL at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. In announcing this four-part test, the 
Court cited Professor Wright's text on Federal Practice and Procedure and 
specifically noted his comment, "after a man has had his day in court, and has 
been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second triaL" kL 
(citation omitted). The district court, reciting these standards, concluded that 
although the identification of Hill's prints qualified as newly discovered evidence 
that was unknown to Johnson prior to trial through no fault of her own, she is not 
entitled to a new trial because the evidence is not material and not likely to 
produce an acquittal on retrial. (R., Vol. 7, pp.1919-1920.) In reaching this 
conclusion, the court noted: 
107. At trial, the evidence of fingerprints on the murder 
weapon, the scope, the box and elsewhere was presented and 
dealt with extensively. (TT 2944:10-3077:25; 5045:15-5132:15; 
5808:1-5843:4; 5846:16-5858:17.) 
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108. The jury was aware that unidentified fingerprints were 
on the scope, gun, some of the shells, and the box containing the 
shells. (TT 3077:1-17). Thus, it was established at trial that 
Johnson had left no fingerprints on those items; if any of the prints 
on those items belonged to the "real killer," then the killer was not 
Johnson and was some unidentified person. 
109. [Trial counsel] utilized this fingerprint information and 
argued it to the jury, to no avail. (See, e.g., Supplemental Appeal 
Transcript, 270:11-272:25) ([Trial counsel's] closing argument that 
the fingerprints on the rifle and scope had not been there very long 
- implying that the "real killer" was unidentified). 
110. The jury was aware of the phantom prints, and they 
still convicted Johnson of both counts of first degree murder; thus, 
telling a new jury the name of the owner of those phantom prints 
will not likely produce an acquittal. 
111. Speegle and Hill both testified as to how, when and 
where Hill had touched the rifle. The fact that this information is 
now known makes the fingerprint testimony even less valuable than 
it was at the time of the trial, when the defense argued that a 
nameless third party handled the gun, the shells and removed the 
scope. 
112. The court recognizes that Mr. Kerchusky testified in a 
contradictory manner to this conclusion; he is convinced of his 
theory of the case, as much a the state's expert, Ms. Walthall is 
convinced that you cannot age fingerprints. 
113. The court's task it to evaluate both witnesses' 
testimony in light of the entire record before the court. In doing so, 
the court chooses not to accept Kerchusky's hypothesis. 
114. This court, as fact-finder, is not bound to accept the 
testimony of any expert witness. [Citations omitted.] 
115. The court simply cannot accept the theory that Hill 
was the unknown killer in this case. Hill testified credibly that he 
was camping on East Magic Road at the time of the murders. He 
had no access to the guest house or to the Johnson home; he has 
no knowledge of the inner workings of the Johnson home, i.e., 
where knives were hidden, where Sarah's robe was kept, or where 
the key to the gun safe was located (to retrieve the 9mm 
magazine). The totality of the circumstances simply does not 
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support Kerchusky's theory that Hill was the last person to touch 
the scope, the gun, or the ammunition and this court does not' 
accept that theory. 
116. The court also does not find it surpnslng that 
Johnson's fingerprints were not on the weapon, the scope, or any 
of the ammunition or packaging, given that a leather glove was 
found in her room in the trash can, and the matching glove was 
wrapped in Johnson's robe ready for trash pickup, along with a 
latex glove containing Johnson's DNA. 
117. Moreover, the trial jury was also instructed on the 
theory of aiding and abetting murder. Use of such instruction was 
affirmed on appeal. [Citation omitted.] 
118. While the state did not rely upon that "theory of 
liability" in proving its case, the jury was free to consider that theory 
because it was Johnson who argued that she could not have been 
the actual shooter. [Citation omitted.] 
119. Nothing presented to this court during the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing establishes that Johnson, even if she 
were not the actual shooter, was not complicit as an aider and 
abettor. 
120. It is undisputed that Johnson was home at the time of 
the murders. There was no forced entry in this case, either to the 
Johnson home or the guesthouse; Johnson's bedroom contained 
.264 caliber cartridges, a 9mm magazine and a right-handed 
leather glove matching the left one wrapped in Johnson's robe in 
the garbage; both gloves belonged to Diane and were kept in the 
family vehicle; the knives found in the guest bedroom and at the 
foot of the Johnsons' bed were located where an intruder or 
stranger would have difficulty finding them; Johnson had a key to 
the guesthouse; Johnson was angry with her parents because they 
disapproved of her relationship with Santos; and Johnson gave 
numerous conflicting stories about what she allegedly was doing 
when her parents were shot. 
(R., Vol. 7, pp.1921-1924.) 
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The court also referenced the trial judge's view of the evidence, quoting 
the Honorable Barry Wood's statements?: 
In think it's really interesting that the brother-in-law, the man 
who had gotten married there the week before, two weeks before, 
whatever it was, that spent, he testified, four or five days in that 
very upstairs apartment in the guest house, and never knew the 
gun was there, never saw it. Used the closet and didn't even know 
the gun was there. Didn't know the bullets were there. 
[T]o suggest to a reasonable jury such things that somebody 
off of the street could come and find that gun in the guest house, 
find those bullets in the guest house, know when the parents were 
going to be there; find the knives in the kitchen that are hidden, the 
one knife that's hidden behind the microwave or bread box, 
whatever it was, in the dark no less; go out past the family dog that 
the evidence was would bark, and the dog didn't bark. 
Take the same route that Sarah Johnson told the police she 
took out of the house, past the trash can where the robe is found. 
Get her bathrobe out of the bathroom next to her room, and not 
awaken her or bother her. 
Both doors being open, according to her experts, the 
parents' bedroom d06r and her bedroom door. Do all of this in the 
dark and not disturb the parents just defies common sense. 
I think a reasonable jury could clearly find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Miss Johnson's involvement here. The jury 
heard all of the evidence about the robe. 
(R., Vol. 7, p.1924 (quoting Supplemental Appeal Tr., 449: 1-450:4).) 
Johnson claims the district court's conclusion regarding the materiality and 
likely to produce an acquittal prongs of the Drapeau test are erroneous for a 
variety of reasons. All of Johnson's argument fail. 
Johnson first contends the evidence is material, arguing "Hill's fresh 
fingerprints were on the gun and ammunition, that he was the one who took off 
7 As a result of Judge Wood's retirement, the Honorable Richard Bevan presided 
over much of Johnson's post-conviction case. 
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the scope shortly before the murders, and he was the last person to touch the 
weapon." (Appellant's Brief, p.52.) This argument is predicated on Johnson's 
theory being true in the first instance. If Johnson's allegations regarding Hill 
were, in fact, true, then her claim of materiality may have merit. Because the 
district court expressly rejected the factual assertions underlying Johnson's 
materiality claim (R., Vol. 7, p.1863), her argument necessarily fails. 
Johnson next attacks the district court's conclusion that the identification 
of Hill's prints would not likely produce an acquittal, asserting error in a number of 
the reasons the court cited in support of its conclusion. These arguments also 
fail. 
Johnson first protests that identification of Hill's prints would likely produce 
an acquittal because, she argues, "unidentified prints are profoundly different 
from identified prints." (Appellant's Brief, p.53.) While identifying a fingerprint 
may, in some instances, raise doubt as to a person's involvement in a crime, it 
does not, and did not, in Johnson's case. The jury was clearly aware that there 
were fingerprints left on the murder weapon and the ammunition insert that were 
not attributable to Johnson and the jury convicted her nonetheless. Matching 
those prints to Christopher Hill only serves to strengthen the state's case against 
Johnson because, as with Mel Speegle, identification of those prints excluded 
another individual as a potential suspect. Even Kerchusky acknowledged at the 
evidentiary hearing that fingerprints alone are not evidence of guilt; rather, prints 
are often obtained, as they were in this case, for the purpose of eliminating 
individuals as suspects. (Tr., pp.632-635.) 
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Johnson, of course, takes a quite different view of Hill as a suspect, 
asserting for the first time on appeal that Sylten, who helped clean the Johnson 
residence on one occasion, basically conspired with Hill to murder the Johnsons. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.55.) This Court should decline to consider this argument 
because it was never presented to the district court. 
In her post-trial briefing, Johnson argued that the Hill evidence would likely 
produce an acquittal because, according to her, "had the jury also known the 
prints were those of a homeless man, with possible motive of financial gain, 
access to the scene of the crime, no alibi, and whose explanation of how his 
prints got on the tools of murder was highly unlikely, reasonable doubt would 
have prevented conviction." (R., Vol. 7, p.1793.) Now Johnson argues, for the 
first time, some speculative nefarious connection between Hill and Sylten that 
allowed Hill, with Sylten's assistance, to murder the Johnsons. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.55-56.) Because this argument is being raised for the first time on appeal, the 
state submits this Court should decline to consider it. See Dunlap v. State, 141 
Idaho 50,56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) ("Idaho Code section 19-4903 mandates 
that the application for post-conviction relief 'specifically set forth the grounds 
upon which the application is based. . .. All grounds for relief ... must be raised 
in [the defendant's] original, supplemental, or amended application.' I.C. § 19-
4908.") (emphasis added). It is equally well-settled that claims not preserved for 
appellate review will not be considered. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) ("Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error 
not preserved for appeal through an objection at trial. This limitation on appellate-
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court authority serves to induce the timely raising of claims and objections, which 
gives the trial court the opportunity to consider and resolve them." (Citations, 
quotations, and brackets omitted.)). 
Even if this Court considers Johnson's Hill-Syiten conspiracy theory, the 
argument fails because it is unsupported by any evidence, is based on factual 
statements that are contradicted by the record, and is generally so farfetched that 
the Court can easily conclude, as the district court would have had Johnson 
presented the argument to it, that the theory would not produce an acquittal. 
Although Johnson speculates that Hill and Sylten may have had a 
"connection" because Hill was "camping by himself on the Magic Reservoir on 
the day the Johnsons were killed" and Sylten "had also been living at the 
Reservoir" (Appellant's Brief, p.55), Johnson presented no actual evidence of any 
"connection" between Hill and Sylten. Indeed, Johnson never asked Hill about 
his relationship, if any, with Sylten (see generally Tr., pp.972-975), nor did she 
call Sylten as a witness at the hearing in an effort to establish any sort of 
relationship between Sylten and HilLa The lack of any evidence of this 
speculative "connection" is sufficient to reject Johnson's argument that it would 
be likely to produce an acquittal. Even if that were not the case, the evidence 
that actually exists reveals just how specious the argument is. 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Hill testified that when the 
Johnsons were murdered on September 2, 2003, he was "camping out on East 
Magic Road." (Tr., p.965, Ls.5-17.) Sylten testified at Johnson's trial on 
a In fact, Johnson did not call Hill as a witness either; Hill was the state's witness 
at the post-conviction hearing. 
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February 15, 2005. (See Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2663.) At that time, Sylten had been 
living at her brother's house in Twin Falls for three weeks. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, 
p.2831, Ls.9-19.) Prior to that, Sylten was living in a house at West Magic 
Reservoir. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2831, L.22 - p.2832, L.6.) Sylten lived there from 
June 2004 until she moved to her brother's house in Twin Falls in January 2005. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2832, Ls.7-12.) Thus, Johnson's claimed "connection" 
between Hill and Sylten is based on the fact that Johnson and Sylten, at two 
entirely different points in time, were in a place with the name "Magic" in it. 
In addition to Johnson's farfetched theory of a murderous connection 
between Hill and Sylten, Johnson's assertions that Hill "knew where to find the 
guns and had a connection to the Johnson house" (Appellant's Brief, p.55) and 
that Sylten "knew the Johnson house intimately having just cleaned it" 
(Appellant's Brief, p.56), are not supported by the record. 
Hill testified that he "might have" handled the rifle again when Speegle 
move into the guest house behind the Johnson residence, but there was no 
evidence that he moved the guns into the guest house, much less that he knew 
where in that house Speegle kept the guns. (Tr., p.963, L.24 - p.964, L.12; 
p.967, Ls.18-21; p.940, L.25 - p.941, L.3; p.949, L.11 P .950, L.1.) Regardless, 
Hill did not have access to the Johnson guest house where Speegle was staying. 
(Tr., p.964, Ls.13-16.) 
Sylten's alleged "intimate" knowledge of the Johnson's house could only 
be based on the one time she spent three to four hours cleaning it with Robin 
Lehat on August 26, 2003, the Wednesday before Labor Day weekend. (Trial 
25 
Tr., Vol. IV, p.2805, L.24 - p.2806, L.9; p.2807, Ls.3-4; Vol. VI, p.3760, L.23 -
p.3761, L.1.) Even then, Sylten's knowledge would be limited to the portions she 
cleaned, which included the master bedroom and bathroom and Johnson's 
bedroom and bathroom, the living room, the pictures, and the half bath. (Trial 
Tr., Vol. IV, p.2808, L.22 - p.2809, L.8.) Robin Lehat "did the rest." (Trial Tr., 
Vol. IV, p.2809, Ls.7-8.) Sylten did not clean in the garage, the vehicles in the 
garage, or any other structure on the property. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2809, Ls.12-
22.) In fact, Sylten never went into the garage and she was unaware there was a 
guest home behind the main residence. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2809, Ls.18-19, 23-
25; Vol. VI, p.3761, Ls.6-8.) 
Johnson also suggests that Sylten had a motive to murder the Johnsons 
to "stop them from making allegations that could result in revocation of her newly 
minted parole." (Appellant's Brief, p.56.) The allegations to which Johnson 
refers relate to some makeup that was missing from the Johnson residence after 
Sylten and Lehat cleaned it. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2810, Ls.7-21.) There is, 
however, no evidence that Sylten's parole status was in jeopardy, much less that 
she would conspire to commit murder and risk going to prison for the rest of her 
life, or perhaps even be subject to the death penalty, in order to avoid such a 
speculative revocation. Further, both Sylten and Lehat denied there was any 
animosity between Sylten and the Johnsons; in fact, Sylten testified she never 
even met Diane Johnson. (Trial Tr., Vol. IV, p.2815, L.14 - p.2817, L.1; see also 
Vol. VI, p.3760, Ls.3-5.) And Lehat testified Diane was not interested in filing 
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criminal charges and did not want anyone fired, but was "actually really, really 
nice about it." (Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.3763, Ls.18-22; p.3782, Ls.12-15.) 
Johnson next argues that the identification of Hill's prints "exonerates" her 
"because it shows she was not the one who fired the weapon that morning and 
shows she was not an accomplice as there is no evidence that she and Hill even 
knew each other much less had a reason to act in concert." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.58.) The identification of Hill's prints, however, does nothing to show Johnson 
"was not the one who fired the weapon that morning" anymore than the existence 
of unidentified prints or Speegle's prints would show such a thing. Further, it is 
ironic that Johnson would argue exoneration as an accomplice based on the lack 
of any "evidence that she and Hill even knew each other much less had a reason 
to act in concert" given her willingness to claim a conspiracy between Hill and 
Sylten based on even less "evidence". 
Johnson also attacks a number of other evidentiary points highlighted by 
the district court in concluding the identification of Hill's prints would not likely 
produce an acquittal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.60-64.) For example, Johnson 
argues "the presence of the gloves in [her] room and the garbage can outside is 
more consistent with an intent by the real killer to divert suspicion to [her] than 
some theory that [she] carefully plotted and planned the murders and then left 
gloves not even used in her room and the trash where they were quickly 
discovered by the police." (Appellant's Brief, p.61.) The readily apparent flaw in 
Johnson's argument is the idea that if she were the "real killer," she would not 
have been so careless as to leave items in the trash where they could be 
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discovered, but another "real killer," i.e., Hill, would be so careless as to leave his 
fingerprints on the murder weapon and get gloves and wear a pink bathrobe, 
neither of which were likely to fit him,9 as props to "divert suspicion" to Johnson. 
Not only that, but, by Johnson's theory, Hill was able to set up such an elaborate 
scene inside the Johnson residence, including inside Johnson's own bedroom, all 
without waking either Johnson or her parents. The trial judge concluded this did 
not make sense as did the judge who presided over the post-conviction hearing. 
(R, Vol. 7, p.1926.) These findings of fact are well-supported. 
Johnson also complains that the district court applied the incorrect legal 
standard because, she asserts, it was not within the court's purview to accept or 
reject Kerchusky's theory, but the court was only to "evaluate how the jury would 
see the new evidence within the context of the trial and then determine whether 
or not it would have raised a reasonable doubt as to [Johnson's] guilt." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.59.) Regardless of how Johnson interprets the district 
court's language, it is clear from the entirety of the court's order denying relief 
that the court was well aware of the controlling legal standards and applied them 
correctly to the evidence presented. (See generally R, Vol. 7, pp.1919-1927.) 
The court specifically noted it had "spent significant hours reviewing the 1000's of 
pages of transcript from trial," "listened to testimony during the post-conviction 
hearing," "reviewed the parties' post-hearing briefing," and "reviewed all of this 
evidence against the legal standards set forth herein." (R, Vol. 7, p.1926.) 
9 Hill testified that he is six feet tall and weighs 200 pounds (Tr., p.963, Ls.9-13.) 
Johnson, on the other hand, was a sixteen-year-old girl at the time of the 
murders. 
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Based on that review, the court concluded, as did the trial judge, that the 
evidence against Johnson is "overwhelming." (R., Vol. 7, p.1926.) The court, 
therefore, concluded "the evidence identifying Mr. Hill's fingerprints is insufficient 
to make such evidence material, or likely to produce an acquittal. As such, 
Johnson's claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence [was] 
DENIED." (R., pp.1926-1927 (capitalization original).) Johnson has failed to 
establish this conclusion was erroneous. 
Because Johnson has failed to establish any error in relation to the 
dismissal of her post-conviction petition, she is not entitled to any relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Johnson's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2012. 
De y Attorney General 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-1 
(' 
THIS MATTER came before the court for evidentiary hearing beginning 
Tuesday, December 7, 2010. The petitioner Sarah Johnson was present throughout the 
hearing, represented by her counsel, Christopher P. Simms. The respondent, state of 
Idaho was represented by Jessica M. Lorello and Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputies 
Attorney General and Special Prosecuting Attorneys for the state of Idaho. 
The hearing was conducted over four days, concluding December 10, 2010. The 
parties requested to submit closing arguments in writing, which were received by the 
court and reviewed as part of this court's fact-finding process. The matter was taken 
under advisement on March 16, 2011, and the court hereby enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
BACKGROUND 
This case presents iID application for post-conviction relief brought by the 
petitioner, Sarah Johnson (Johnson) in her Second Amended Petition, filed January 11, 
2010. This court previously ruled on dispositive motions in this case on or about July 
19 and December 2,2010. Johnson also voluntarily dismissed certain claims prior to 
h"ial. At this juncture the following seven claims remain for resolution by this court: 
1. Ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from an overall 
lack of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of the case, 
chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings, including 
trial, all of which together resulted, cumulatively and individually, in a 
manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict; 
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2. Ineffective assistance of counsel for ff,illing to request a 
continuance or adequately preparing to cross examine state's expert, after 
learning a comforter had not been collected as evidence; 
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately 
investigate the scientific basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on 
blood splatter opinion evidence; 
4. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately 
cross-examine Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Elisson, Sheriff Jerry 
"Walt" Femling, Detective Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuela 
Cedeno, Glenda Osuna, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, Becky Lopez, Carlos 
Ayala, Officer Raul Ornelas, and Detective Stuart Robinson; 
5. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present 
evidence of an audio recording, recorded inadvertently by Officer Ross 
Kirtley, which recording allegedly proved the theory that police focused 
on Petitioner Sarah Johnson, to the exclusion of all other possible suspects 
and theories, because she was the easiest target; 
6. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inquire 
whether certain previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh"; and 
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7. Newly discovered evidence relating to the recent 
identification of Christopher Hill as the source of some of the previously 
unidentified latent fingerprints. 
While the state has not delineated two of these issues specifically in its proposed 
findingp herein, it has acknowledged all seven of these claims in its arguments. This 
court will ther~fore discuss the issues as set forth above and, excepting the cumulative 
error issue, in the order presented by Johnson in her post-hearing memoranda. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ON POST CONVICTION 
1. Trial counsel failed to timely file a notice of appeal after Johnson was 
sentenced. 
2. On or about April 19, 2006, Johnson filed her initial Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, from which she was granted relief to pursue a direct appeal, with the 
remaining post-conviction issues stayed. 
3. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Johnson's conviction on or about June 
26,2008. See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008). 
4. On or about August 15, 2008, this court lifted the previously entered stay 
and thereafter granted leave for Johnson to file a First Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. 
5. On or about December 28,2009, this court granted Johnson leave to file a 
Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
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6. On or about February 8, 2010, Johnson and the state of Idaho filed cross 
motions for summary disposition. 
7. The motions were heard on April 20, 2010. This court ruled from the 
bench, dismissing some of Johnson's claims. The court took further issues under 
advisement and issued a memorandum decision and order on May 20, 2010, regarding 
those claims. The court~s order concerning those claims was entered on July 19,2010. 
8. The state filed a motion for reconsideration as to two issues. This court 
granted relief in part on December 2,2010, dismissing Johnson's claim regarding 
appellate counsel. 
9. On December 6,2010, Johnson filed a memorandum dismissing an 
additional claim. 
10. This court conducted an evidentiary hearing/trial (hereinafter referred to 
as evidentiary) from December 7 through December 10,2010. 
11. This court heard from the following witnesses during the evidentiary: 
Patrick Dunn; Mark Rader; Raul Comelas; Stuart Robinson; Bob Pangburn; Jerry Walt 
Femling; Jane Lopez; Steve Harkins; Consuelo Cedeno; Bruno Santos; Maria Eguren; 
Robert Kerchusky; Tina Walthall; Mel Speegle; and Christopher Kevin Hill. 
12. These witnesses varied in their abilities to remember and relate facts of 
consequence in this case. The court notes its particular ability to observe each witness' 
demeanor and credibility in making the factual findings set forth herein. 
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13. Counsel filed post-hearing briefing on or about February 14, 201t and 
again on or about February 28, 2011. The court took this matter under advisement as of 
March 16, 2011. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The following Findings of Fact are based upon this court's review of the 
evidence admitted at the trial of this cause, along with the court's unique opportunity to 
view and observe each witness who testified, thereby making observations regarding 
each witness' demeanor, credibility and reliability.l 
2. On the morning of September 2, 2003, Alan and Diane Johnson were 
found shot to death in their home, where they lived with their daughter Sarah Gohnson) 
(See Exhibit 2 (hereinafter Trial Transcript (TT) 1645:9-1663:6; 1887:1-1889:9); see also 
Post- Conviction Evidentiary Hearing (PCH) Exhibit 12). 
3. Early on the morning of September 2, a neighbor of the Johnsons, Kim 
Richards, was awakened by her daughter Rachel, indicating that she heard screaming. 
Mrs. Richards 1/ got out of bed and ran to the front door" and I'turned on the front porch 
light and unlocked and opened the front door/' when she saw Johnson running down 
their driveway toward their house. (TT 1518:2-11). 
J The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence are all matters solely within the province of this court. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL 4483675, 2 (Idaho 
App. 2010) (citing Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988)); see also I.R.C.P 52(a). 
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4. Mrs. Richards and Rachel attempted to find out what was happening. 
Johnson was screaming and breathlng heavily, stating that someone had shot both of 
her parents. (TT 1518:18-1519:23). 
5. Immediately before coming to the Richards' home Johnson had been to 
the homes of two neighbors who did not answer the door when Johnson knocked. (TT 
1537:11-15; 1518:8-11). 
6. Although Johnson denied any involvement in the shooting, she gave 
several different accounts of what she allegedly was doing, what she saw, and what she 
heard just prior to and after the murders. 
7. Johnson initially claimed she heard a gunshot while she was in her room 
asleep, that she sat up in bed, then heard a second shot, went to her parents' bedroom 
door, called for her mother, then fled the house. (TT 1519:6-1521:7; 1558:3-19). Johnson 
initially stated she had not seen anything before leaving the home. (Id., 1521:3-7). 
8. 'The second time Johnson told the story, a short time later, her report 
differed: she stated she was awakened by the sound of her father in the shower before 
she heard any shots. (TT 1528:3-18). 
9. Johnson told yet another version of events a short time later. (TT 3696:6-
3701:15; 3739:24-3742:22). 
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10. Upon being asked the first time by the police what had happened, just a 
few minutes later, Johnson attempted to reconcile her statements, stating that her 
father's starting the shower initially woke her up, but she went back to sleep and was 
re-awakened again by the first shot. (IT 1811:21 - 1813:6; 2099:17 - 2103:21). 
11. In this statement, Johnson also claimed for the first time she had opened 
the door of the master bedroom before fleeing the house. (TI 1850:1-23). 
12. Johnson later told a friend that she had immediately fled the house upon 
hearing the shots. (IT 3297:22 - 3298:22). She told this friend's mother that, after 
hearing a shot and going to her parent's closed bedroom door, she heard arguing, called 
out to her mother, and then fled the house. (Id., 3529:10 - 3530:15). 
13. Johnson was interviewed approximately three hours later by Detective 
Steve Harkins of the Blaine County Sheriff's Office. Detective Harkins gave Johnson her 
Miranda warnings. (TT 2107:15-23). Johnson then gave additional details during this 
interview. (See generally id., 2106-2111). 
14. Later that day, Johnson told her brother Matt that she was awakened 
upon hearing the first shot, went to her parents' closed door and called out for them, 
then heard the second shot and fled the house. (TT 4545:16 - 4548:12). 
15. Johnson was interviewed again the day after the murders. (TT 2424:16-
2426:7). Johnson stated she was awakened when she heard the shower come on, and 
then a few minutes later heard a shot. (Id., 2426:8-2428:4). She got out of bed, went 
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through her bathroom into the guest bedroom, out into the hall, and to the door of the 
master bedroom. (Id.,2428:5-2429:9). Johnson stated her bedroom door was either 
closed or open only a crack. (Id., 2429:10-13). 
16. In this interview Johnson claimed she heard the second shot while 
standing outside the master bedroom door, but that the doors were open because her 
parents propped their door open with a pillow. Johnson stated she did not see or hear 
anything indicating a struggle. (IT 2429:14 - 2432:1). 
17. Law enforcement arrived at the Johnson home shortly after Johnson 
arrived at the Richards' residence. 
18. Trooper Ross Kirtley, (Kirtley) an Idaho State Police officer was the first to 
arrive on the scene. (TT 1645:24 - 1652:11). He was followed shortly thereafter by 
Bellevue Marshall Randy Tremble (Tremble). Officer Raul Ornelas (Ornelas) and 
Deputy Jamie Shaw (Shaw) arrived soon thereafter. (Id., 1686:21-24). 
19. Kirtley and Tremble did a security search of the north-half of the house. 
(TT 1787:4-13). 
20. Diane Johnson's body was located in a bed in the master bedroom. A 
cream colored comforter covered her body. (TT 1792:16 - 1793:3). Kirtley pulled the 
comforter back with his asp, revealing Diane's body with most of the head missing. 
(Id., 1793:19-21). 
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21. The comforter was not collected as evidence, (IT 1986:23 -1987:6), which 
was, in retrospect, a mistake. (Id., 2016:21 - 24). , 
22. About twenty-five days after the murders Johnson told yet another 
version of events. She told a relative that the first shot woke her up; she heard a second 
shot, ran to her parents' bedroom, and saw blood on the walls and floor. (TT 3684:22-
3690:12). 
23. Johnson's inconsistent statements regarding what she saw, did and heard 
around the time of the murders are significant in relation to other evidence. Several of 
the people who saw Johnson the morning of the murders noted her hair and 
appearance were not consistent with her claim that she was asleep in bed when the 
murders occurred. (IT 1545:20-1547:18; 1559:14-1560:11; 1818:19-1819:19; 2520:15-
2521:23). 
24. Johnson's claim that her parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door 
had been closed was also inconsistent with the presence of Diane's blood and brain 
matter in Johnson's own bedroom across the hallway from her parents' room. Part of 
Diane's skull was also found in the hallway outside the master bedroom. (IT 1619:20-
1620:10; 1637:5-15; 1655:2-1657:9; 1868:2-18; 2019:24-2020:18; 2020:24-2022:3; 2121:7-
2124:4; 3122:11-3123:20). 
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25. Additionally, Diane's blood was found on the socks Johnson was wearing 
the morning of the murders. (1755:8 -1759:8; 3120:21- 3122: 13; 3423:8-14; 3475:19-
3476:3). 
26. Johnson had a bruise on her left shoulder that was consistent with a recent 
impact, such as a rifle recoil. (TT 2248:3 - 2250:9; 2317:6 - 2318:18). 
27. Johnson admitted owning a pink bathrobe (TT 2436:7-18). She admitted 
that a right-handed leather glove found in the trash in her room belonged to her mother 
and was usually in the car (Id., 2036:1-2037:6; 2436:19-2437:1; 3596:20-3598:1), and 
Johnson claimed there should not have been any bullets in her room (2437:2-17). 
28. It is notable, however, that two unspent .264 caliber cartridges of the type 
used in the murders were found in Johnson's bedroom. (TT 2033:11-2034:18). Diane's 
blood was found on the cartridges. (Id., 3122:11-3123:24). In addition, the police found 
the spent casings from the rounds that killed Alan and Diane in the garage and in the 
master bedroom (still in the rifle). (Id., 1840:15-1842:12; 1843:24-1844:15; 1954:11-
1956:21; 2051:3-2053:8; 2912:6-2954:16). 
29. Also significant was evidence law enforcement found in a trash can set 
out on the street for collection the morning of the murders. The trash can was pulled 
back from the curb by law enforcement shortly before it would have been collected. (TT 
1672:19-1673:11). Found in the trash can were: one latex glove and one left-hand 
leather glove, (which matched the right-hand glove found in JOMson's bedroom), 
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wrapped in a pink bathrobe that belonged to Johnson. (Id., 1672:16-1673:17; 1826:16-
1832:14; 1893:19-1902:17; 4566:16-4568:17). Five .25-caliber shells were also found in the 
pocket of the robe. (Id.,1900:19-1901:13). Testing revealed Johnson's DNA was present 
inside the latex glove. (Id., 3106:5 -3110:3). 
30. Inside the robe were paint chips that matched paint on the shirt Johnson 
was wearing the morning of the murders. (TT 1755:8-1758:13; 3574:1-3587:21). 
31. The pink robe itself tested positive for blood and DNA from Diane (IT 
3114:2-3117:11; 3434:11-3459:3; 3473:13-3475:2), DNA possibly from Alan (id" 3434:11-
3459:3), gunshot residue (id" 3229:15-3238:20), and tissue from Diane. (Id" 3446:19-
3448:18; 3454:16-3455:23). The blood on the robe was consistent with the shooter 
having worn it backwards during the shooting. (Id./ 4194:5-4211:21). 
32. With respect to Johnson's access to the murder weapon, the weapon had 
been stored in a closet in a guesthouse located near the Johnson residence. (IT 2418:8-
2419:22; 2702:3-2706:1). 
33. The guesthouse was an apartment above the detached garage on the 
Johnson property. Johnson had a key to the guesthouse and had been in there several 
times, including the days immediately preceding the murders. (Id., 2037:7-2038:6; 
2257:7- 2258:10; 2437:18-2439:23; 2688:25-2690:6; 2715:12-2716:6; 3274:11-25; 3285:6-
3293:7; 3335:14-3336:22). 
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34. Officers obtained a search warrant on the day of the murders and served it 
a short time later. While searching the officers located the scope from the murder 
weapon in the guesthouse on the bed, and Officer Comelas observed human footprints 
in the dew on the lawn going to and from the Johnson home and the guesthouse. (Id., 
1733:20-1738:25; 1842:8-1843:3; 2056:2-2057:22; 2685:12-2686:25; 2706:2-16; Post-
Conviction Hearing Transcript (PCHT) 206:6-208:25). 
35. A nine-millimeter handgun magazine from the guesthouse was also found 
in Johnson's bedroom, wrapped in a red bandana on the shelf below where the two 
.264-caliber shells were found. (IT 2038:7-2040:10). A nine-millimeter handgun 
matching the magazine was in a gun safe in the guesthouse (Id., 2061:11-2062:12). 
Johnson had asked her parents for a key to the family's gun safe two days before the 
murders. (Id.,3336:10-22). A key to the guesthouse was also found in Johnson's room 
(Petitioner's Ex. 4). 
36. The search also produced a box of .25 ammunition in the garage, with five 
shells missing. The .22 rifle normally kept in the guest house was in the garage on top 
of the freezer, and a spent .264 casing was located in the garage as well. (ld.). 
37. Based upon the evidence obtained by the Blaine County prosecutor, a 
grand jury convened and ultimately indicted Johnson for two counts of First Degree 
Murder. (Petitioner's Exhibit I, page 511:3 - 512::16; TT 1458:18-1460:7). 
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38. Johnson's trial was conducted between February 7 and March 16, 2005. 
(IT 1454:16-20, 6173:18-6175:22). 
39. The Honorable R. Barry Wood, District Judge, presided at the trial. 
40. Johnson was represented by two attorneys at trial: Bob Pangburn 
(pangburn) and Mark Stephen Rader (Rader). 
41. At the conclusion of the trial Johnson was convicted of both counts of first 
degree murder, as well as an enhancement for using a firearm in the commission of the 
crime. (IT 6174-6175). 
42. The defense II team" 2 included Mr. Patrick Dunn (Dunn), a private 
investigator who assisted Pangburn and Rader prior to and during the trial. Dunn's 
wife was also a member of the team, along with vanous experts who would be available 
from time-to-time to consult with counsel, some of whom testified at the trial. See infra, 
Finding of Fact ~ 88. 
43. Pangburn practiced law for about twenty years before he surrendered his 
license to the Oregon State Bar on or about September 8, 2004. The state of Idaho 
suspended Pangburn's license on January 17, 2008 by Order of the Supreme Court. The 
Idaho suspension was a result of multiple violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct (see Petitioner's Exhibit 15), including violation of Rule 8.4( c) for 1/ conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Id. 
2 Pangburn also felt that Rader's associate attorney, Anita Moore, was a member of the "team." 
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44. While the court gives the suspension weight in evaluating Pangburn's 
credibility, the factthat Pangburn is now suspended does not make his testimony 
entirely unworthy of belief. The findings of fact set forth by the court herein regarding 
Pangburn's testimony and his conduct are based on the entirety of the record, which 
includes his individual testimony. Where the court's findings are based upon 
Pangburn's testimony, the court has engaged in the appropriate weighing process and 
accepts his testimony as true, notwithstanding his ethical misconduct. 
45. During his lawyering career, Pangburn practiced primarily criminal 
defense, including representing hundreds of prisoners in the state of Oregon. 
46. Pangburn tried over 100 cases to jury in Idaho and Oregon. 
47. Pangburn devoted a large amount of time to Johnson's defense, spending 
"hundreds and hundreds" of hours on the case between 2003 and 2005. (peRT 279:25-
280:20). 
48. Before assuming responsibility for the Johnson case, Pangburn 
represented a number of people with homicide-related charges. Pangburn also handled 
a number of post-conviction and habeas cases involving murder and aggravated 
murder in Oregon. 
49. Rader has been licensed to practice law in Oregon since 1973 and in Idaho 
since approximately 1990. Rader's practice is focused on aggravated murder and 
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capital murder cases in Oregon. He also does some post-conviction work in those kinds 
of cases. 
50. The court gives limited weight to Rader's testimony in this case because 
he was admittedly confused about several areas of his testimony and he had poor 
recollection of the details regarding his beliefs and opinions. (See, e.g., PCHT 188:5-
189:2). Rader further admitted his bias in that he would like to see Johnson have 
another trial. (Id.,195:9-12). This admission causes this court to give even less weight to 
Rader's testimony in this proceeding. 
51. Pangburn, on the other hand, testified that the defense team did a "real 
good job" of defending Johnson, 1/ given what [they] had to work with." (PCHT 268:9-
11). While the court discounts this self-serving statement to some degree, the record 
ultimately sustains Pangburn's conclusion that both attorneys representing Johnson 
were qualified; both worked diligently on the case and both put forth significant effort 
in Johnson's behalf. 
52. Rader has experience with ballistics experts and multiple contacts with 
forensic experts due to the focus of his legal practice. Rader was thus familiar, based on 
his significant experience, with the evidentiary standards necessary to challenge or 
admit expert or forensic testimony in court. 
53. Rader was asked by Pangburn to assist with the Johnson defense 
primarily to handle the forensic/scientific evidence. Rader also had prior involvement 
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with Dunn, and suggested that the team hire Dunn when there was a falling-out 
between Pangburn and a prior investigator. 
54. Dunn has significant experience as an investigator and he is now working 
primarily as an investigator on post-conviction criminal cases. 
55. Dunn was hired generally to review and evaluate the police investigation, 
review the evidence and witness interviews and assist with trial preparation. 
56. In a general sense, when Dunn is hired as an investigator he initially 
receives and reviews material from the defense attorneys, which the attorneys receive 
via discovery from the prosecution. This pattern was followed by Dunn, Pangburn and 
Rader in this case. 
57. Once Dunn has a grasp of the evidence in the case, he then organizes the 
material for trial counsel. Dunn organizes the material chronologically and he also 
creates an alphabetical witness listing. Dunn does not generally create written reports 
because such reports may have to be provided to the state, thus giving away defense 
strategy. Again, Dunn followed this pattern as a member of the Johnson defense team. 
58. Like Rader, Dunn expressed a bias favoring the success of Johnson's post-
conviction petition. (See Rader's Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief). This again causes the court to question Dunn's testimony at the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing; however, the court accepts some of Dunn's testimony as accurate 
regarding selected details of the case, as is set forth below. 
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59. Dunn had done criminal investigation work for Rader prior to the Johnson 
case. Dunn understood that Rader and Pangburn decided to change investigators on 
the Johnson case in March 2004 and he was hired thereafter. 
60. Dunn met weekly with Rader, but not as often with Pangburn. Prior to 
trial the defense team met less than once per month with both lawyers and Dunn 
present. 
61. Pangburn felt that the meetings between the lawyers and Dunn were held 
often enough for case preparation. Dunn disagreed,3 but this court concludes that both 
counsel prepared adequately for the Johnson trial. 
62. The first thing Dunn received was the Grand Jury transcript. He then 
received police reports and witness statements from the police; later in the process he 
and Rader received and reviewed the forensic evidence. 
63. One of Dunn's stated concerns regarding Pangburn's preparation 
involved Pangburn's obtaining discovery and carrying it around in his trunk, 
sometimes for weeks. (peHT 42:17-19). Nevertheless, Dunn ultimately received all 
discovery in the case, albeit later than he might have liked. 
64. Dunn had access to all the discovery necessary to prepare the case and to 
prepare witness books for every witness in the case in advance of trial. 
3 Dunn swore-out an affidavit in support of Johnson's petition in which he testified that Pangburn was unprepared in 
the case. Dunn testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that he had never made such an allegation against 
an attorney before. 
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65. Pangburn indicated that associate attorney Moore organized the discovery 
and copied it for Rader and Dunn. Ultimately the parties received the discovery, 
although Pangburn did argue several motions to compel during his representation of 
Johnson, (TT 787; 837-39; 863-866), and some information was received late in the 
process. 
66. The witness books Dunn compiled consisted of an index in the front and a 
copy of every statement that related to an individual. The team had such books for all 
witnesses, and for most subject matters. There were three copies of each book: one for 
each attorney and a working set which was kept in a room right off the courtroom for 
Use during the trial. When the team knew which witnesses were coming up, the books 
were available for counsel's review. 
67. The plan for trial was that Rader would handle the forensic experts and 
Pangburn would handle all the other witnesses. No exceptions had been discussed to 
this plan in advance of the trial. 
68. During trial the attorneys and Dunn would meet every day after trial, and 
in the morning, prior to trial, to go over the witness list to make sure everyone was 
prepared. 
69. Dunn testified that in the morning meetings, he and Rader would be the 
first ones at the courthouse, and they would bring out the books, go through the books 
and make any adjustments necessary. Pangburn was not always present for the pretrial 
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meetings each day, although Dunn cannot say what Pangburn was doing during these 
times. 
70. Pangburn admitted that he made several appearances on the Nancy Grace 
television show, (pCHT 273:12-14) and that he attempted to arrange an interview of 
Johnson on Nightline. (Id., lines 15-18). While this court has reservations about such 
conduct, there has been no showing that Pangburn's media contacts or appearances 
undermined trial strategy, affected the jury pool, or otherwise had any casual nexus 
with Pangburn's performance or the jury's verdict. 
71. During the early pre-trial phase, there really wasn't a working strategy for 
the defense team; the best Dunn could glean is that they wanted to go after Bruno 
Santos (Santos). 
72. Dunn did a "fairly in-depth" investigation of Santos, spanning from Utah 
to Hailey, Idaho to Montana. Dunn obtained police statements regarding Santos' 
alleged gang affiliations and Santos' known associates. Santos had a gang tattoo and 
the school was aware of his gang status. 
73. Dunn couldn't interview Santos extensively because Santos "lawyered-
up"; however, Dunn was able to interview Santos one time during the Johnson trial. 
74. Santos was Johnson's boyfriend at the time of the murders, and he was an 
initial suspect of both the police and the defense team. 
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75. The record thus establishes that the police did not focus on Johnson to the 
exclusion of all other suspects. (PCHT 405:12-13). To the extent that Johnson suggests 
that Santos was ruled out as a suspect on the day of the murders, any such claim is not 
supported by the evidence. 
76. Despite Dunn's in-depth investigation, he was not able to discover that 
Santos was convicted of any felony crimes. (See IT: 860:2-5). Dunn uncovered 
information that Santos had been involved in a possible rape of a girl out of Sun Valley, 
and he identified the girl and made contact with her father. While the father confirmed 
the information Dunn had discovered, the father did not want his daughter subpoenaed 
and he moved the daughter out of Idaho. 
77. Through the school, Dunn obtained a record of a number of fights when 
Santos was a juvenile. 
78. Through the course of Dunn's investigation, Santos denied any sexual 
contact with Johnson; however, the defense team had sheets from Johnson's bed tested, 
which showed DNA from Santos, which confirmed in Dunn's mind that Santos had 
sexual contact with Johnson. 
79. The court finds that Johnson and Santos were having a sexual relationship 
while Johnson was a minor. 
80. Dunn was unable to locate any evidence linking Santos to the commission 
of the lohnson murders. The police also had no evidence establishing such a link. 
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81. Pangburn testified that the information the defense team had on Santos 
was "not necessarily what they were looking for," which this court concludes means 
that there was no evidence indicating that Santos was personally culpable for the 
Johnson murders. (PCHT 259:16-17; 284:23-285:3). The court agrees with this 
conclusion. 
82. Moreover, the court further concludes that the evidence which the defense 
team did have on Santos was largely inadmissible, either due to Santos' assertion of his 
5th Amendment rights, or based on the nature of the evidence and evidentiary rulings 
made by Judge Wood during trial. 
83. Johnson references alleged statements by Santos about his car possibly 
having been in the area of the murders on the morning of September 3; however, there 
is no evidence that such statements were made as cited by Johnson. When interviewed 
by Detective Harkins, Harkins asked Santos: "What if I told you that someone said that 
they seen [sic] your vehicle in the area that morning?" (Petitioner's Exhibit 34, p. 13). 
Santos response to this question was: "I don't know, maybe someone, some guy get my 
car I don't know, I don't think so. I was asleep .. .. " (ld.) Thus, Santos' statement was 
clearly not an admission that his car was in the area of the murders on September 3. 
84. Harkins explained to this court that his question was not based on 
evidence the police had, but on an interview technique. (pCHT 409:15-22). 
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85. Thus, as a matter of trial strategy, the defense focus moved from Santos to 
a "no blood, no guilt" theme. (IT 4603:5-6; 4610:21-23; pcm 264:8-13). 
86. Rader testified that their goal at trial was to show that if Johnson had 
pulled the trigger, she would have been covered with blood and other matter, and she 
couldn't have gotten out of the room without significant blood on her person. (PCHT 
157:2-14). 
87. The court concludes that the defense, both Pangburn and Rader pursued 
this "no blood, no guilt" strategy with witnesses and argued the same to the jury. (IT 
4603:5-6; 4610:21-23; PCHT 264:8-13; Supplemental Appeal Transcript 270:8-272:25). 
88. The defense also focused their efforts in trying to undermine the state's 
case with science, (IT 4604:25-4605:1) and the defense called several scientists to 
support their arguments. E.g., Dr. Craig Beaver, id., 6367-6407; Dr. Todd Grey, id" 
5350-5379; Michael Howard, id., 4685-4941; Keith Inman, id., 5240 - 5348; Robert 
Kerchusky, id" 5045-5130; Dr. Leslie Lundt, id., 5480-5522; Ron Martinez, id" 5179-5191; 
and Rocky Mink, id" 5618-5734). 
89. The defense also brought-out the deficiencies in the state's evidence 
collection practices, as noted during their opening statement. (IT 4603-4610). These 
deficiencies focused on the comforter covering Diane and other items that were not 
collected as evidence. 
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90. Dunn testified that he brought shortcomings of the police investigation to 
the attention of R~der and Pangburn, i.e., Exhibit 5, which showed a green carpet, 
covered with blood, and a towel bar, which items were not taken into evidence. Dunn 
also told the attorneys that fingerprints were not taken from the top of the garbage can, 
which would have, in his opinion, been a critical identifier as to who opened the can. 
See PCH Exhibit 6. 
91. The court finds that the lack of fingerprinting the garbage can was 
inconsequential, given the myriad of individuals who had potential contact with the 
can. 
92. Finally, the defense relied upon unidentified, but matching fingerprints 
found on the scope, the rifle and a box of ammunition to point the finger of blame away 
from Johnson. 
a. The Comforter. 
93. The allegation regarding the error in failing to request a continuance is 
based on late-disclosed discovery regarding the comforter which had covered Diane's 
body. The state failed to collect the comforter as evidence during their search, causing a 
perceived need for the defense to have additional time to consider issues surrounding 
the missing comforter and "what happens to a head when it's shot at close range, those 
kinds of things." (PCHT 162:1-7). 
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94. There was little testimony before this court regarcling the comforter which 
covered Diane Johnson's body when she was found. The court is without the benefit of 
any evidence which indicates what value the comforter might have had, in retrospect, 
from a forensic point of view. 
95. Rader testified that the defense was informed ot the comforter not being 
collected as evidence at a time /I close" to trial, but he could not recall how close. (IT 
158:24-159:10; 162:3-12). 
96. Rader testified that the defense should have asked for a continuance: 1/ 
we should have backed up a little bit at that point, ... and asked for a continuance orr] 
whatever, however much time the court would do it, give us, to back up and re-
examine some of this material and try and find a better way of presenting it at trial .... " 
(PCHT 121:20-25). 
97. Rader swore-out an affidavit in support of Johnson's case wherein he 
concluded that his conduct was ineffective in failing to move for a continuance of the 
trial. The court does not accept Rader's conclusions in this regard. 
98. The record shows that Rader was prepared; that both he and Pangburn 
conducted examinations and/or made strategic decisions based upon the nature of the 
case at the time. While, given the outcome, the court understands how Rader can 
second guess his own performance, and that of Pangburn, Rader's conclusions are not 
borne-out by the entire record before this court. 
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99. No other witness referenced the need for a continuance or what it would 
have done to benefit the defense team. 
b. I.S.P. Video/Audio. 
100. Dunn also reviewed a copy of an ISP video/audio which this court 
listened to during the evidentiary hearing. (pCH Exhibit 12). Dunn had the audio 
enhanced, but the enhanced version was not available for this court. 
101. The audio portion of the recording reveals a number of conversations, 
some of which are inaudible, among members of law enforcement. 
102. Johnson played the entirety of the recording at the evidentiary hearing 
and asked Sheriff Jerry (Walt) Femling about some of the voices he could identify on the 
recording (pcm 335:17-336:12). 
103. The video starts with Trooper Kirtley's stop at roughly 6:10 a.m. on 
September 2, 2003, after which Kirtley proceeded to the crime scene. Kirtley was the 
first officer at the crime scene and he recorded4 conversations for about 2.5 hours. 
104. The enhanced audio includes the voice of Sheriff Femling, Trooper Kirtley 
and Bellevue Marshall Trumble. 
105. Dunn concluded that the recording held good information for the defense 
because it contained the initial impressions of law enforcement regarding the crime 
scene and the officers' initial suppositions about the case. 
4 The dashboard camera simply video-recorded a house across the street from the Johnsons' home while the officers 
were conducting their business inside the Johnson home. The audio recorded Kirtley and others' statements during 
the approximately 2.5 hour-period. 
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106. Dunn's synopsis was that the officers did not think it was possible for 
Johnson to have committed the crime because the blood spatter was everywhere and 
Johnson didn't have any blood on her. Dunn felt the defense should play the enhanced 
version of the whole tape; however, counsel disagreed and the recording was not 
introduced. 
107. Rader was generally aware of the law enforcement recording which was 
played during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Rader's knowledge came from 
Dunn; Rader never reviewed the recording himself. (PCHT 185:2-3). Rader further 
believed that Pangburn was aware of the recording and that he would seek to admit it 
during the cross-examination of Kirtley. (ld., lines 12-16). 
108. Pangburn testified that the recording would not have added much to the 
case, but that that tape may have helped and it was probably a mistake not to seek to 
admit it. (PCm 269:5-12). However, Pangburn wouldn't go so far as to say he should 
have sought to admit the recording, but that, in hindsight, he "would think more about 
putting it in." (ld., lines 13-16). 
109. Sheriff Femling (Femling) could be heard on the recording making a 
statement that he was concerned about the community or the valley being worried with 
a murderer running around and that Femling thought they should concentrate on the 
girl. The officers also discussed that Johnson was an unlikely suspect, due to her not 
being covered with blood. 
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110. Dunn acknowledged that strategic decisions during trial are within 
counsel's discretion and that the same would hold true as to what evidence was 
admitted and what cross-examination would be conducted of a particular witness. 
c. Division of Labor/Defense Team Interaction. 
111. Rader noted that he was primarily engaged to handle the scientific 
experts; however, he testified that he learned a few days before their fingerprint expert, 
Robert Kerchusky (Kerchusky) was called, that Pangburn would be handling 
Kerchusky's direct examination. 
112. Pangburn indicated that the decision for him to handle the fingerprint 
experts was to allow him to be more involved in that part of the case, and to take some 
of the load off Rader. 
113. Rader had concerns regarding how the defense team was interacting 
throughout their preparation and handling of the trial. He expected the case to be 
defended as a team, and to be able to share their opinions; however, Rader felt that 
Pangburn did not seem interested in doing that at all. Their conversations were so 
limited that they were not engaging as a team. 
114. Pangburn disagreed with this testimony and indicated that he and Rader 
worked IItogether" from the beginning of their association. Pangburn recognized that 
he was "lead" counsel; however, he and Rader worked well together throughout the 
case. Pangburn does not recall handing Rader a witness notebook at the last minute 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 28 
( 
and asking Rader to handle the witriess' cross-examination. The court accepts 
Pangburn's memory and testimony in this regard, given Rader's credibility and 
memory issues previously noted herein. (See supra" 50). 
115. Rader's examination of several lay witnesses was very limited, in that he 
asked no questions, or very few questions. However, very little in the record from the 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing establishes what information would have been 
elicited from those witnesses had they been asked further questions during the murder 
trial. 
116. Moreover, this court concludes, based on the weekly and ultimately daily 
meetings, at least between Rader and Dunn, that Rader had an adequate grasp of the 
facts regarding such witnesses when he asked them limited or no questions. 
d. Rader's Knowledge of the Law and Scientific Principles. 
117. The trial record also establishes that Rader fought for the admission of the 
defense scientific tests and experiments which had been done seeking to replicate the 
blood spatter that would have occurred when Diane Johnson was shot in the head. The 
experiments used multiple media, i.e., coconuts,'melons, pig's heads, Styrofoam heads, 
(TT 4506:17-19), containing multiple substances, i.e., plastic bags with sponges, 
pudding, half and half colored blue and red. (Id., lines 19-23). 
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118. Rader's efforts were made during an extensive hearing on the state's 
. motion to exclude these experiments, primarily the experiment conducted using a 
coconut. (IT: 4291-4328; 4336-4503). 
119. Judge Wood ruled that the experiment was inadmissible, citing forensic 
pathologist Glen Groben's testimony that there were insufficient similarities between 
the coconut used in the experiment and a human head. (TT 4503-4508). 
120. Judge Wood did indicate to counsel that if they desired to "try to re-
replicate th[e] test" in the "proper environment," he would "take another look at it." 
(IT 4509:17-22). 
121. At the hearing before this court, Rader testified that, in response to the 
court's ruling, he asked his experts "to go back and find, see if there's something else 
[they] could do," whether there was "some other object that [they] could shoot/ but his 
experts "didn't come up with anything." (PCHT 166:13-167:2). 
122. In hindsight, Rader testified he could have 1/ gone out to ... various 
defender agencies in various places around the country" to "see if [he] could find 
different experts or different information somehow." (Id., 169:9-24). 
123. Johnson presented no evidence at the hearing regarding what experts 
Rader would have located had he "reached out," nor did Johnson present any evidence 
regarding what other experiments or reconstruction options could have been presented 
to the trial court. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 30 
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additional testing could have provided by way of a test which would have been 
admissible. Six years have now passed, and nothing has been presented to this court to 
show that any such evidence exists. 
125. While Rader felt that he should have reached out further, to other defense 
groups, in seeking to find different. experts or different information regarding the blood 
spatter testimony, nothing has been provided to establish that such reaching-out would 
have accomplished anything more than the defense tried to accomplish at the time of 
trial. 
e. Facts Regarding Cross-examination. 
126. The defense also raised issues regarding cross-examination of several 
witnesses. Those matters are detailed individually as to those witnesses, below. 
A. Sheriff Walt F emling. 
127. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson asked Sheriff 
Femling (Femling) whether he recalled "making statements to the press very shortly 
after [the murders], assuring the public that there was no concern for their public 
safety." (Tr., p.328, Ls.4-7). Femling answered: 
Yes. I thought that was very important to let my community 
know that I did not believe that this was a random act of 
violence or we had some killers out there running, that were 
just randomly picking homes and, you know, shooting 
people. 
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So the crime scene definitely told me that probably was not 
the case. 
(pCHT 328:8-15). 
Femling further explained his initial impressions based upon the crime scene: 
I think what the crime scene was telling me pretty quick was 
that it was not committed from, by somebody from the 
outside as a random killer or killers that came into the scene. 
It was somebody that was familiar with the house and the 
contents of the house and that the information that I was 
getting from investigators who had talked to Uohnson] was 
not adding up to what the crime scene was telling me. So at 
that time, it was, you know, something's not right here from 
potentially my only witness to these two homicides. 
(PCHT 326:12-23). 
128. Femling also testified before this court that he did not, at least initially, 
"form[] the theory" that Johnson murdered her parents "out of revenge." (pCHT 
338:11-25). 
129. Notably, it took weeks before Femling and his department ruled out 
Johnson's boyfriend, Bruno Santos, as a suspect. Femling did not want to believe 
Johnson committed the murders because Johnson went to school with Femling's son 
and it was hard to believe that she could have killed her parents. However, a crucial 
piece of evidence leading Femling to believe Johnson was involved" came in six weeks 
after th[e] case started." (Id., 340:17-342:4; 350:20-351:25). 
130. That crucial piece of evidence was Johnson's DNA on lithe gloves that 
were wrapped in the bathrobe found in the garbage can." (PCHT 341:10-14). 
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the scope of the investigation surrounding the murders: 
You know, lean' t give you a time when I, you know, 
absolutely felt confident that it was - [Johnson] acted alone. 
I can tell you, once again, is that we worked really hard to 
make sure that we covered every basis that we could, and 
Bruno Santos was not involved. We believe very strongly 
that he was not involved. There is no evidence at all to put 
him at that scene of that crime .... 
(pCRT 349:5-13). 
132. In addition to investigating Santos, law enforcement also investigated: (1) 
Janet Sylten, the cleaning lady Johnson claimed to have heard at 2:00 in the morning 
outside her house the morning of the murders (PCll 354:23-356:1,358:20-22); (2) Mel 
Speegle, the owner of the murder weapon (id., 356:2-7, 361:3-362:1); (3) the possibility of 
a robbery, which there were no signs of at the residence (id., 356:8-24); and (4) whether 
someone escaped up the embankment behind the house based on Johnson's claim that 
the killer went out the back door (id., 356:25-357:19). 
133. Consistent with his testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, 
Femling testified at trial that, on the day of the murders, he identified four persons of 
interest - Speegle, Santos, Johnson, and the cleaning lady. (TT 2417:10-2418:2). Also 
consistent with his post-conviction testimony, Femling testified at trial that he did not 
want to believe Johnson committed the murders and he continued to investigate other 
possibilities. (Id., 2424:1-7). 
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134. Femling also testified to this court, as well as at trial, that law enforcement 
interviewed "upwards of 400 people," prepared 11,000 pages of reports, spent $517,000 
investigating the case, collected over 400 pieces of evidence, assigned 3.5 people to the 
case full-time for a year and one-half, and followed-up on all investigative leads. (IT 
2458:4-2461:16). 
135. Rader cross-examined Femling at trial. (TT 2461-2496; 4057-4059). 
136. Johnson did not ask Rader any questions at the post-conviction 
evidentiary about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Femling. (See 
generally PCHT 138-195). 
B. Steve Harkins. 
137. At the Johnson trial, in response to a question on direct about how many 
"calls or interviews" were conducted with Santos, Detective Harkins (Harkins) testified: 
"I don't know if I can give you an exact number. I talked to him a number of times. 
Numerous interviews. Weekly contacts, sometimes two or three times a week. We 
made contact over the phone, met in person. I didn't document every contact I had 
with him." (IT 2191:1-6). 
138. Harkins further testified he had spoken to Santos "over a hundred" times 
lI[o]ver the last year and a half," "maybe a lot more." (Id.,2114:20-23). 
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139. Johnson alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to "adequately cross-
examine" Harkins about this statement, claiming I'police reports and supplements do 
not support this bald assertion." (petition, p.l0, ,16.a.i.). 
140. Johnson further alleges in her Petition that counsel failed to adequately 
cross-examine Harkins IIregarding the lack of depth to the search of Santos [sic] 
residence [or] outside dumpster," his IIfailure to acquire fingerprints from [Santos'] 
known associates," lithe inconsistencies in statements made by Santos [sic] family 
members, including his mother and cousin," or about lithe fact that .25 caliber 
ammunition was found in Bruno Santos [sic] residence and in the pink robe found in 
the trash can at the crime scene." (Petition, p.l0, , 16.a.i, p.12, ~ 16.a.vi.). 
141. Pangburn cross-examined Harkins at trial. (IT 2169-2222, 2235-2244). 
142. Pangburn did not cross-examine Harkins about the number of times he 
indicated he had spoken with Santos, nor did Pangburn ask Harkins about any alleged 
inconsistencies in statements made by Santos or his family members or the ammunition 
found in Santos' residence or the Johnson's garbage can. (See generally id.). Although 
Pangburn did not cross-examine Harkins about his failure to "fingerprint[]" Santos' 
IIknown associates," Pangburn did ask Harkins about his investigation of Santos' 
/I associa te s ."5 
5 Marshal Tremble was also asked about his investigation of Santos' "associates." (IT 1861:16-1863:24). 
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143. Pangburn's cross-examination did cover several areas, (See generally TI, 
pp. 2197-2202), including Santos' associates who were "law breakers/, (IT 2199:1-9) and 
Santos' "drug dealer connection." (Id., 2197:2-12, 2200:16-22). Harkins was even asked: 
"did you look for someone who may, at the request of Bruno Santos, kill these people?" 
(Id., 2200:5-7). 
144. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Pangburn 
any questions about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Harkins. (See 
generally PCHT 237-279). Johnson did call Harkins as a witness at the evidentiary 
hearing, but Johnson also failed to ask him any questions about his testimony.regarding 
the number of times he had contact with Santos. (See generally id., 378-441). 
145. Johnson also did not introduce any "police reports" or "supplements" at 
the post-conviction evidentiary hearing to rebut Harkins' trial testimony about the 
number of times he had contact with Santos. 
146. Johnson did ask Harkins about the extent of his search of Santos' 
residence. Harkins testified in that regard that he did not recall what his role in the 
search was, i.e., whether he "actually did the searching or instructed other officers to, to 
search the residence." (PCRT 406:20-24). Harkins acknowledged the "trash 
receptacles" at the apartment complex where Santos lived were not searched. (Id., 
407:17-22). Harkins explained the "trash receptacles" were not searched "because [he] 
and ten other detectives probably didn't think it was necessary." (Id., 410:1-3). 
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147. Johnson did not introduce any evidence regarding what a more extensive 
search of Santos' residence or a search of the "trash receptacles" would have uncovered. 
148. Johnson also asked Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
whether any .25 automatic shells were found at Santos' residence and Harkins agreed 
that those were found. (Pcm 410:11-25). Harkins further testified that he was aware 
that .25 shells were found in the pocket of the robe discovered in the garbage can at the 
Johnson's house.6 (Id., 411:1-6). 
149. With respect to his involvement in the investigation of Consuelo Cedeno 
and Jane Lopez, Harkins testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not recall 
interviewing them, but he was sure he talked to them "at one point." (pcm 411:10-14). 
150. Johnson did not ask Harkins about any inconsistencies in Cedeno's 
testimony but she did ask Harkins questions about Lopez's testimony. Specifically, 
Johnson asked: I/[I]f I told you that those phone numbers [that were subpoenaed] 
verified that Jane Lopez did not in fact call Bruno nor the home phone number when 
she originally told you and when she testified before the court, do you think 1'd be 
mistaken about that?" (pCHT 413:7-12). 
151. Harkins responded that he had "an explanation of why they weren't 
recovered." (Id., lines 13-14). That explanation was that if a call was made from I/Qwest 
to Qwest numbers, local carriers, [they] would not be recorded," and that "in 2003 the 
6 Exhibit 20, admitted at trial, was a photograph of five rounds of .25 ammunition found in the pocket of Jolmson's 
robe. (IT 1900:19-1901 :13). Exhibit 103, also admitted at trial, was a photograph ofa box of Remington .25 
automatic shells with five missing rounds. (ld., 2048:1-16). 
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whole valley's local phone carrier was Qwest." (Id., 414:3-5, 15-17) . So, if Jane Lopez 
had "called from the school to a home number, it wouldn't be recorded." (Id., 416:3-4). 
152. Johnson also asked Harkins at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing 
whether he "learned quickly" who Santos' 1/ close associates were." (PCHT 422:16-18). 
Harkins answered: "I don't know which ones you're referring to. There was several 
interviewed that were friends of his." (Id., 422:19-21). johnson specifically asked about 
1/ Ayala," and Harkins agreed he was interviewed. (Id., lines 22-24). Johnson then asked 
whether Harkins ever "took any DNA swab from Ayala." (Id.,422:25-423:1). Harkins 
testified that he could not recall. (Id., 423:3). 
153. Johnson did not ask Harkins about fingerprinting Ayala, nor did she ask 
him about any other of Santos' If associates." 
C. Bruno Santos. 
154. Johnson's Petition alleges counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-
examine Bruno Santos about the 1/ abundant information" that Santos "was dealing 
drugs," IIhad gang connections," and had "committed the crime of statutory rape." 
(Petition, p.13, 1 16.d). 
155. While both attorneys handled both lay and expert witnesses during the 
trial, Pangburn generally handled the lay witnesses. Nevertheless, Rader did conduct 
the cross-examination of several lay witnesses, including Santos. (PCHT: 172:19-173:2). 
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156. The court concludes that the claim regarding a last-minute hand-off of 
Santos' cross-examination to Rader is disproved by the record. 
157. The state brought a motion in limine under I.R.E. 609 and 404(b) regarding 
Santos' prior history. (See IT 2739:8-24). The state sought to preclude the defense from 
asking Santos about his arrest on October 30, 2004, or about "statutory rape" or "having 
sexual relations with Sarah Johnson." (Id., 2739:8-2740:3). 
158. The prosecutor objected to any inquiry on the arrest as irrelevant and on 
the grounds that Santos would "be claiming the Fifth" on any "pending case" and 
would also "invoke his privilege not to incriminate himself" on his sexual relationship 
with Jolmson. (IT 2739). The state also objected to any questions on a previous battery 
charge when Santos was a juvenile. (Id., 2740:24-2741:7). 
159. Counsel for Santos confirmed that he advised Santos to "invoke his 
privilege against self-incrimination with respect to any questions relating to drug 
activity" and any questioning regarding his sexual relationship with Johnson. (IT 
2743:12-15,2751:24-2752:18). 
160. Rader responded to the state's motion and ultimately agreed not to 
inquire of Santos regarding his October 30 arrest or the "juvenile information." (TT 
2745:4-17; see also p. 2748:1-2749:6 (Rader explaining in detail why Santos' gang 
involvement and "other bad acts" should be admitted); p.2750:4-2751:1 (Rader offering 
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further argument regarding why he believed certain evidence relating to Santos should 
be admitted». 
161. Rader thus argued in specific detail referencing Santos' history and prior 
acts, indicating the scope of the cross-examination that he wished to conduct. 
162. For example, Rader argued that he intended "to ask questions about 
[Santos'] gang involvement ... and the fact that [Santos] admitted having sexual 
relations with Sarah Johnson seven times, and she was a minor at the time and he was 
an adult .... Then [he intended] to ask him about his gang connections and the story 
he told the police about his gang involvement." (IT 2747:2-11). 
163. Rader showed additional direct and significant knowledge of Santos' past, 
as well as the defense purpose for their intended cross-examination. (IT 2748:1-2749:6). 
164. Judge Wood essentially granted the state's motion in limine; however, he 
offered the option of a stipulation regarding some of Santos' history. (IT 2754:16-
2755:19). 
165. Although the trial court limited the scope of Santos' cross-examination, ' 
much of the information that was subject to the state's motion in limine had already 
been elicited through cross-examination of other witnesses. For example, during cross-
examination of Femling, Rader elicited that Santos was a "look-out" for a fight, which 
resulted in a suspension. (TT 2474:8-2475:3). Rader also asked Femling about Santos' 
reported drug use, to which Femling responded: "I think we did show that he does 
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have involvement in drugs" and that he had "used illegal drugs/' (id., 2475:21-2476:7), 
and examination of Detective Harkins revealed that Santos had a 1/ drug dealer 
connection." (Id., 2197:2-12,2200:16-22). 
166. On direct examination at trial, Santos testified: (1) he was dating Johnson 
when the murders occurred (TT 2761:15-19); (2) Alan Johnson came to his apartment the 
weekend before the murders and threatened that if he did not "leave his daughter 
alone, ... he was going to hit [him] and ... put [him] in jail" (id., 2762:5-18); (3) he saw 
Johnson the Monday before the murders and she was acting "weird" (id., 2763:9-2764:7); 
(4) he spent the night at home the night before the murders (id., 2764:16-20); (5) his 
cousin, Jane Lopez, called him about the murders the morning they occurred (id., 
2764:24-2765:5); (6) he was surprised about the murders and went to the Johnson's 
home to see what happened (id., 2765:6-2766:9); (7) he allowed law enforcement to 
search his car and apartment, he submitted to fingerprint and blood testing, and gave 
them his clothes (id., 2766:16-2767:3); (8) he saw Johnson at the hospital the day of the 
murders at which time she hugged him and told him she loved him and said she was 
sorry and "not to worry" (id., 2768:7-2768:5); (9) he was deported in September 2003 
and returned to the United States to testify (id., 2768:17-2769:4); (10) he was not at the 
Johnson's house the night before' the murders and did not remember Johnson telling 
him there were guns in the guest house (id., 2769:5-10); and (11) there was a wedding at 
the Johnson's house the weekend before the murders that Johnson wanted him to 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 41 
(. 
attend, but Alan would not let him, which upset Johnson (id., 2770:21-2770:6). Santos 
denied having anything to do with murdering Alan and Diane. (Id., 2769:11-13). 
167. After Santos testified to these facts, and based on Judge Wood's ruling, 
Rader indicated that the defense" decided not to enter ~to a stipulation and ... decided 
not to cross examine Mr. Santos ... at all." (Id., 2771:11-15). 
168. Thus, this court concludes that Rader was well-versed and well prepared 
to cross-examine Santos, but that given Judge Wood's ruling and Santos' intention to 
assert his 5th Amendment privilege, the defense, as a matter of strategy, chose not to ask 
any questions at all. 
169. This court recognizes that Johnson asked both Rader and Pangburn at the 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing about the decision not to cross-examine Santos. 
170. Despite Rader's vigorous response to the state's motion in limine 
regarding the scope of Santos' cross-examination, Rader claimed at the evidentiary 
hearing that Pangburn would, without any "warning," have Mr. Rader cross-examine 
witnesses he had not planned on cross-examining, including Santos. (peRT 172:19-24). 
171. Rader could not recall how many witnesses he cross-examined, or even 
recall the witnesses he was responsible for, yet he claimed Pangburn gave him the 
responsibility of cross-examining Santos without any prior notice. (PCHT 172:13-173:2; 
188:5-189:2). 
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172. Pangburn denied Rader's assertions, testifying that the decision to have 
Rader cross-examine Santos and other witnesses was not made at the last minute, and 
that Rader did not object to cross-examining any particular witness. (peHT 282:19-
283:19). 
173. The court again accepts Pangburn's testimony in this regard because it is 
more credible than Rader' 5, given Mr. Rader's involvement in arguing the motion in 
limine, during which he demonstrated extensive knowledge of the information 
available on which Santos could be cross-examined and the reasons why he believed 
such cross-examination should have been permitted. Pangburn's testimony is also 
more believable considering Rader's general inability to remember even who he cross-
examined. 
174. Most significantly, Rader still believed at the time of the post-conviction 
hearing that he handled the fingerprint evidence, even though the record clearly 
indicates Pangburn handled that evidence. 
175. Johnson also called Santos as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing. This court concluded, as had Judge Wood, that Santos could invoke his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during the evidentiary hearing. When 
asked about his "gang connections/' Santos did just that, declining to answer any 
questions on that subject. (PCHT 482:10-14). 
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176. Given this court's ruling, and Santos' counsel's :indication that he would 
continue to assert his privilege, Johnson did not ask Santos about the other topics she 
claimed in her Petition that trial counsel was :ineffective for fail:ing to :inquire :into, i.e., 
1/ deal:ing drugs" and whether he had" committed the crime of statutory rape."7 
(petition, p.13, ~ 16.d; PCHT 472-490). 
D. Consuela Cedeno. 
177. With respect to Ms. Cedeno, Johnson alleges in her Petition: 
Mr. Pangburn had been provided information based on 
prior statements of Consuelo Cedeno wherein she insisted 
her son Bruno Santos had not driven the car the morning of 
the murders because there was dew on the w:indshield. 
Further, Ms. Cedeno asserted in pre-trial statements that she 
checked the mileage on the vehicle to see if Bruno was ly:ing 
about where he had been .... Ms. Cedeno testified at trial 
that she didn't pay attention to such things. Yet, Trial 
Counsel failed to cross-examine Ms. Cedeno. 
(Petition, p.12, ~ 16.a.v. (capitalization orig:inal, citations omitted)). 
178. At trial, Ms. Cedeno testified (through an interpreter), in relevant part, as 
follows: 
Q: Okay, the morning Alan and Diane Johnson were killed, 
Tuesday morning, did you go to work that morning? 
A: Yes. 
7 Nor did Johnson ask either Mr. Rader or Mr. Pangburn about the decision not to enter into a stipulation regarding 
the sexual nature of Johnson's relationship with Santos. (See generally PCHT pp. 138-187, 196-198,237-279). 
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Q: Do you recall seeing Bruno in the house that morning when 
you went to work? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was he doing? 
A: He was sleeping. 
Q: All right, and about what time do you go to work? 
A: Well, exactly, I couldn't really tell you. I don't remember, 
but I think around 7:30, 8:00. I always leave around 7:30 or 8:00. 
Q: Okay, where was Bruno sleeping at that time? 
A: In a mattress in the living room. And then my bedroom is 
right next to it. 
Q: And when you left to work that morning, the morning Alan 
and Diane were killed, did you see Bruno's car in the parking lot? 
A: It's actually my car, and I always take it; and sometimes he 
does take it, too. But it's usually just me, because I am the one that 
has the key, so it was parked. 
Q: And could you tell whether or not it looked like the car had 
been driven that morning before you got into it? 
A: No. 
Q: And how could she tell? 
A: Because I have the key. I have the key. 
Q: Miss Cedeno, was there anything on the window, was there 
. dew on the window? 
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A: Well, no, no. I don't pay attention to things like that. But 
no, I didn't look. 
Q: But it's her car and she had the keys to it? It's your car, and 
you had the keys to it, is that correct? 
A: Always. 
(IT 2774:19-2776:9). 
179. In response to this testimony, Rader indicated that the defense would not 
be cross-examining Ms. Cedeno. (IT 2776:12-13). 
180. Prior to this decision being made, the defense investigator Dunn had 
reviewed the statements of Cedeno and Jane Lopez (Lopez). (See PCH Exhibit 13, a 
transcript of the interview of Cedeno and Lopez, conducted by two law enforcement 
officers, with Lopez translating for Cedeno). Cedeno is Santos' mother; Lopez is 
Santos' cousin. 
181. Dunn found some things problematic with Lopez and Cedeno's 
statements. Cedeno gave statements to the police concerning the condition of Santos' 
(her) vehicle, i.e., that it had dew on the windshield and that she had checked the 
odometer to see whether Santos had been driving the night of the murders. 
182. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Dunn testified that he made 
counsel aware of information that Ms. Cedeno /I gave statements to the police 
concerning ... the condition of Bruno's vehicle, which was actually her vehicle," that 
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there was" dew on the window, that she checked the odometer and various things like 
that." (pCHT 62:18-23). 
183. Dunn checked with the weather service and found that there was no dew8 
that day, which made it a contradictory statement to him. Dunn made Pangburn aware 
of that information. (pCHT 63:3-7). 
184. While examining Rader at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, 
Johnson asked Rader about his decision not to cross-examine Cedeno. (PCHT 178:15-
21). Rader testified that he did not "remember doing that, but [he] wouldn't be 
surprised if [he] did." (Id., 178:22-23). 
185. Rader further testified that, although he did not remember that Cedeno 
made certain statements to police about keeping track of the mileage on the car or that 
Santos IIwas always lying to her," he was not prepared to cross-examine her because 
Mr. P.angbum "handed off that witness." (Id. / 179:13-180:5). 
186. Johnson called Ms. Cedeno as a witness at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing. (PCHT pp. 457-468). Cedeno largely denied any recollection of the events 
surrounding the murders of Alan and Diane. (PCHT pp.460-468). 
187. With respect to the only claim in Johnson's Petition regarding the cross-
examination of Cedeno - that counsel failed to cross-examine her regarding her 
statements to law enforcement that she checked the mileage on the car and saw dew on 
8 The court notes that Officer Cornelas testified about footprints in the grass at the Johnson residence and the heavy 
dew that morning, which directly contradicts Dunn's testimony on this point. The court find's Officer Comelas' 
testimony more credible on this point than that of Dunn. 
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the windshield the morning of the murders - Cedeno testified she did not remember 
making either statement to law enforcement. (PCHT 464:7-468:7). 
188. This court did not find any value from Cedeno's testimony at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing. She certainly appeared to be a hostile witness to all . 
concerned, and the breadth of her loss of or lack of memory is astounding. 
Nevertheless, there is nothing in this record to conclude what Cedeno knows now, or 
what she knew in 2005 at the time of trial, to support any factual conclusion in that 
regard. 
189. This court cannot conclude, as a matter of fact, that Pangburn just "passed 
off" the cross-examination to Rader, given the overall distrust this court has for Rader's 
testimony and his lack of memory regarding the facts. 
E. lane Lopez. 
190. As to Jane Lopez, Johnson's Petition alleges: 
[A] discrepancy existed, between Jane Lopez's trial 
testimony and proof to the contrary found in phone records, 
indicating Bruno Santos was not at his mother's house. Trial 
Counsel was made aware of this discrepancy, yet, Trial 
Counsel failed to utilize the records on cross-examination. 
(Petition, p.12, , 16.a.v. (capitalization original, citations omitted)). 
191. At trial, Ms. Lopez, who worked at the Blaine County High School at the 
time of the murders, testified that after she heard about the murders, she called Santos 
around 8:30 a.m. (IT 2789:14-2791:20). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 48 
192. Lopez testified that first she called Santos' house, "and he didn't answer," 
so she "called his cell phone, and he answered." (IT 2791:22-24). She asked Santos 
"where he was, and he said, I at home.1II (Id., 2791:24-25). When Lopez asked why he 
did not answer the home phone, Santos stated he was sleeping and told Lopez that if 
she did not believe him, she should call him again at the home number. (Id., 2791:25-
2792:3). Lopez testified that she then did call Santos at home, "he answered the 
phone/' and she told him about the murders. (Id., 2792:3-8). According to Lopez, 
Santos "seemed really surprised and really shocked." (ld., 2792:22-25). 
193. Dunn obtained information about these phone calls to the Cedeno 
residence which he felt directly conflicted with statements made by Lopez regarding 
her telephone calls with Santos the morning of the murders. 
194. Dunn contends that Exhibits 9,10, 11 and 40, when taken together, set 
forth that Lopez's statements were incorrect and the phone calls were not made as 
Lopez said. Dunn therefore concluded that Santos was not at home when Lopez said he 
was. Dunn made that information known to Pangburn because he thought it was 
critical. 
195. Dunn prepared a witness book for Lopez and one for Cedeno. Dunn 
included Exhibit 13 in the books he provided Pangburn. 
196. Rader cross-examined Lopez at trial, asking whether those were the "only 
phone calls" she made to Santos. (IT 2794:6-7). Lopez answered, "yeah./I (IT 2794:15). 
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197. Ms. Lopez reiterated this version of events at the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing. (PCHT 370:22-372:10, 374:19-375:1). Lopez did not, however, 
remember the actual phone numbers she called. (Id., 375:1-25). 
198. Johnson did not attempt to impeach Ms. Lopez with any phone records 
during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (pCHT 368-376). 
199. Rader testified that he was simply handed the witness book for Cedeno, 
and that he was not prepared to conduct her cross-examination. In retrospect Rader 
indicated that the defense team was "incompetent" by his not requesting a brief recess 
or continuance to allow him to familiarize himself with the matters contained in Lopez's 
witness book. (PCHT 181:2-182:8). 
200. This court has reviewed Exhibits 9,10,11 and 40, along with the testimony 
from the post-conviction evidentiary hearing in this regard. The court concludes that 
these exhibits do not establish the facts which Dunn asserts they do. Rather, the court 
concludes that the testimony given by Lopez was more probable, that she attempted to 
call Santos' cell phone, and thereafter that she called Santos at home on a land line from 
the school. This call was made via a Quest land line-to-land line call, which would not 
be traceable through any type of documentation. (PCHT 414:3-17). 
F. Raul Ornelas. 
201. Johnson's Petition alleges trial counsel "fail[ed] to adequately cross-
examine Officer Raul Ornelas who testified regarding footprints allegedly observed in 
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wet grass in the back yard," and "[s]pecifically, ... failed to point out the [sic] Tim 
Richards, the neighbor who first responded to the scene had walked the very area of the 
back yard later observed by Ornelas," and counsel"further failed to highlight the fact 
that Ornelas concluded that the footprints were made by more than one person, thereby 
pointing blame from Gohnson] alone and onto unidentified murders." (petition, p.l0" 
16.a.ii.). 
202. At trial, Tim Richards, (Richards) who was not called as a witness at the 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing, testified that after Johnson came to his home 
reporting that her parents had been shot, he walked down the 1/ gravel road" by the 
Johnson residence and "peered into the backyard," then "went around the back side of 
the guest house" where "there's a little bit more grave1." (IT 1586:7-10, 1607:15-25). 
Richards further testified that there is a dirt hill behind the guest house and that he did 
not see any footprints going up the hill. (TT 1608:4-18). 
203. Thus, contrary to the assertions in Johnson's Petition, there is no evidence 
that Mr. Richards "walked the very area of the back yard later observed by Ornelas." 
Rather, Mr. Richards only testified that he walked down the gravel road, not that he 
walked in the grass, which is where Officer Ornelas observed the footprints. 
204. With respect to footprints, Officer Ornelas (Ornelas) testified on direct 
examination at trial that, after responding to the Johnson residence, he was "looking 
around" and "noticed that there were tracks in the lawn." (TT 1735:17-18). The prints 
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were "due north to the back of th[e] guesthouse" and "disappeared there by the stairs." 
(Id., 1736:10-12). 
205. In all, Ornelas saw "two or three sets of footprints" because the grass was 
dewy, including "footprints that led back to the garage." (IT 1736:20-1737:15). Ornelas 
could not, however, tell whether the prints belonged to more than one person. (Id., 
1737:20-22). Ornelas did not observe any footprints going up the embankment behind 
the house or from the "patio that leads off of the bedroom ... on the northeast side." 
(Id., 1738:14-25, 1739:11-19). 
206. Pangburn cross-examined Ornelas at trial. (IT 1759-1772). On cross-
examination, Pangburn specifically asked Ornelas about the footprints he observed in 
the yard and his failure to conduct an /I extensive search" of the hillside for footprints. 
(Id., pp.1765-1771). 
207. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Pangburn 
about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Ornelas. (See generally PCHT 
pp.239-279). 
208. Johnson did, however, inquire of Ornelas regarding his recollection of the 
footprints he observed on the morning of the murder. (peRT 205:15-18). Ornelas 
reiterated that he observed footprints in the backyard and again described those prints. 
(Id., pp.205-209). Ornelas further testified that he was not aware of "anybody else" who 
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had "been in the backyard looking for a possible perpetrator prior to [his] arrival." (Id., 
209:8-15). 
209. Also contrary to Johnson's assertion, Officer Ornelas did not "conclude[] 
the footprints were made by more than one person;" in fact, he specifically testified that 
he could not tell. The testimony that "there were two or three sets of footprints" is not 
equivalent to the footprints having been made by more than one person. 
G. Stuart Robinson. 
210. In her Petition Johnson alleges trial counsell/should have been aware" 
that "Officer Stu Robinson's Grand Jury testimony asserted that no latent prints were 
found at the crime scene" but fI[ d]iscoverable documents[ ] made absolutely clear that 
this testimony was inaccurate and false testimony, in that the record reveals that thirty 
nine (39) latent prints were found at the scene .... " (petition, p.13, ,16.b.). 
211. Stuart Robinson testified to this court about his collection of evidence at 
the crime scene, and particularly about the testimony he gave before the grand jury, 
wherein he testified that the Idaho State Forensics lab "could not locate any prints that 
could be identified." (PCHT 231:11-17). Robinson's answer was in response to a 
question from the prosecutor, Mr. Thomas, asking "as part of your case review, as far as 
you know, did any identifiable prints come back on the gun, the scope, or the casings?" 
(Id., lines 11-15). 
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212. The court finds that Robinson's answer was correct to the question asked 
by the prosecutor. The fingerprints were not identified at that point in time. 
213. Rader cross-examined Robinson at trial and did not attempt to impeach 
him with his grand jury testimony. (IT pp. 2069-2082.). 
214. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson read the following 
excerpt from Robinson's grand jury testimony to him: 
Mr. Robinson, that [grand] juror asked: You say you found a .264 
casing in the garage and one in the chamber. I'm wondering if any 
prints were taken and found on those casings. 
[The prosecutor] interjected, as it's his right to do, and said: Good 
point. Let me ask you this, Detective Robinson. Did you collect the 
gun, the scope, the casings, and probably a whole host of other 
, things to send for fingerprint analysis? 
And you said at that time -- this is back in October of 2003 -- yes, 
we did. 
Question [by the prosecutor]: Now, on the gun and the scope and 
the casing, did your Idaho State Police lab do that analysis or 
attempt to do that analysis? 
Mr. Robinson: Yes, that's correct. 
[The prosecutor] asked you the question: Now, based on your -- on 
your, I guess, investigation and as part of your case review, as far 
as you know, did any identifiable prints come back on the gun, the 
scope, or the casings? 
And you answered: They could not locate any prints that could be 
identified. 
(PCHT 230:19-231:17). 
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215. Johnson then asked Robinson to agree that the testimony was inaccurate. 
(pCHT 232:15-17). Robinson did not agree and explained that, contrary to Johnson's 
interpretation of the testimony, his testimony accurately stated that the prints could not, 
at that time, be identified. (Id., 232:18-234:2; see also id., 236:21-237:3). 
216. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Johnson did not ask Rader 
about his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Robinson. (See generally PCHT, 
pp. 138-187, 196-199). 
f Facts Regarding Fingerprint Issues. 
217. Rader was also involved with pre-trial interviews wi~ fingerprint expert 
Robert Kerchusky, (Kerchusky), but Rader testified that he became aware some time 
before trial that Pangburn was going to present Kerchusky as a witness. (pCHT 186:6-
18). 
218. Rader met with Kerchusky and Kerchusky had some concerns about the 
information given him by the state; however, Rader did not remember any discussion 
with Kerchusky before the trial about Kerchusky's opinion regarding the freshness of 
the fingerprints. (Id., 187:3-10). 
219. At trial, Tina Walthall, (Walthall) a fingerprint examiner with the Idaho 
State Police, testified that she received fingerprint cards from Johnson, Bruno Santos, 
Alan Johnson, Diane Johnson, Mel Speegle, Janet Sylten (the cleaning lady), Russell 
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Nuxoll (the cleaning lady's boyfriend), Matthew Johnson aohnson's brother) and Robin 
LeHat (the cleaning lady's employer). (TT 3009:16-20). 
220. Walthall used these print cards to compare with the prints lifted from the 
crime scene. (TT 3018:2-5). After those comparisons, certain fingerprints taken from 
the crime scene remained unidentified, including fingerprints found on the stock of the 
rifle (Id., 3027:20-3028:22), the scope from the rifle (Id., 3042:22-3044:2), and two boxes of 
.264 shells (Id., 3049:-3052:3). 
221. A search of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) prior 
to trial using three of the unidentified prints also revealed no matches to any of the 
unidentified fingerprints. (TT 3045:1-3046:10,3053:5-11,3066:1-13). 
222. Walthall repeatedly testified there is no way to date a fingerprint to 
determine when it was left (TT 3028:13-17,3044:22-25,3052:22-25; 3058:19-3062:11, 
3073:5-15). Walthall specifically stat~d: (1) "many, many years can pass and you might 
still find usable fingerprints on" paper or cardboard (TT 3060:10-11); (2) she has 
discovered prints off of nonporous surfaces more than a year later (id., 3061:4-5); (3) one 
would expect to find fingerprints more than a year old if nothing happened between 
"when they were deposited and when [they were] processed" (id., 3061:20-25); and (4) 
"it is probable that a fingerprint would last up to and exceeding a year, providing there 
has been nothing to damage that fingerprint in the interim," which is true even on a 
nonporous surface (id., 3062:3-6). 
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223. The defense called Kerchusky to testify at Johnson's trial, and again before 
this court. 
224. During the trial, Kerchusky was asked by Pangburn how long fingerprints 
can last. He replied that "we can't be sure how long they're going to last," but that 
"pretty much on my experience, after a year, they're just about gone, as far as I'm 
concerned." (IT 5070:6-12; see also 5128:18-5129:16 (latent prints on a non-porous 
surface will not last more than one year)). 
225. Kerchusky further testified that fingerprints will dry up and evaporate 
over the course of one year. (IT 5074:7-9). Kerchusky also agreed, however, that it is 
fair to say that a fingerprint on a box could last for years and years and years. (ld., 
5075:9-14). 
226. Mr. Kerchusky, however, acknowledged that aging of fingerprints on 
nonporous surfaces is a controversial subject because "there's so many variables as far 
as weather, where it's located. I mean there's so many things that come into it, there's 
no way in the world anybody could write any article on it." (TT 5107:3-6). 
227. Kerchusky also acknowledged that fingerprints on porous surfaces can 
last for years and that there are some "rare" instances where a latent print that was over 
a year old could be found on a nonporous surface. (TT 5130:8-16). Kerchusky further 
testified that although he could not determine how old a fingerprint is, he "still would 
have an opinion as far as whether it's a fresh print or not." (TT 5108:1-6). 
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228. In 2009, approximately four years after Johnson's criminal trial, Walthall 
compared the unidentified prints from the murder scene to prints belonging to Mr. 
Christopher Kevin Hill (Hill). (PCHT 652:2-21). Walthall testified at the post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing that, of the previously unidentified fingerprints, Hill's matched 
those that were found on the scope, the boxes of ammunition, and the rifle. (Id., 654:2-
22; see also p. 659:11-14). 
229. Walthall also testified, as she did at trial, about "aging" fingerprints and 
how long fingerprints can last. (See generally PCHT, pp.661-670). Walthall reiterated the 
opinion previously expressed at trial that fingerprints can last longer than a year. (Id., 
670:4-11). 
230. Mr. Kerchusky also testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 
(See generally PCHT pp. 538-638). Kerchusky's post-conviction testimony was 
substantially similar to his trial testimony in that he testified that fingerprints left on 
nonporous surfaces "will be gone within a year." (ld., 553:15-554:10). 
231. Kerchusky also referred to the prints on the rifle, scope, and ammunition 
(Christopher Kevin Hill's prints) as "fresh" because, according to him, any prints left on 
the gun before Mr. Speegle put it in his closet would have been wiped off by the clothes 
hanging in his closet and because the prints were not "etched." (PCHT 589:2-15; see also 
id' l 609:22-610:17, 612:21-613:21). 
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232. With respect to the new information that some of the previously 
unidentified fingerprints had been matched to Mr. Hill, Kerchusky testified that, in his 
opinion, Hill was the last person to touch the .264 rifle and scope and that it was Hill 
who removed the scope. (pCHT 615:23-616:19). However, Kerchusky admitted on 
cross-examination (as he did at trial) that he has no way of knowing when fingerprints 
are placed on any given item. (Id., 627:15-17). 
233. At the evidentiary hearing before this court, Kerchusky found fault with 
Pangburn because Pangburn did not ask him specifically whether the unknown 
fingerprints were "fresh." Kerchusky testified that several of the prints were fresh, and 
that he had spoken to Pangburn during the trial, requesting that Pangburn put him 
back on the stand to discuss the freshness of the prints, but that Pangburn declined to 
do so. 
234. It was implied, if not expressed at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, 
that Pangburn's examination and presentation of Kerchusky's testimony was 
insufficient because Pangburn was inadequately prepared to present the expert, based 
upon the original plan for Pangburn to handle just the lay witnesses. 
235. The court does not accept this proposition for two reasons: first, the 
record of Pangburn's examination sets forth that he was prepared for the examination, 
and that he discussed various hypotheticals that brought the pertinent issue (aging of 
fingerprints) before the jury for Kerchusky to comment on. (E.g. TT:5071-5072); second, 
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the record also establishes that Pangburn conducted the cross-examination of the state's 
fingerprint expert, Ms. Walthall, on February 16, 2005, more than i:vvo weeks before 
Kerchusky's examination on March 3,2005. (Id., 5044:15). Clearly the decision for 
Pangburn to handle the fingerprint evidence was decided long before Kerchusky took 
the stand in March. 
236. At trial Pangburn began his cross-examination of Ms. Walthall with 
questions regarding "this idea about aging fingerprints," (IT 3058:11-12), and he 
inquired further regarding the defense theory that fingerprints would dissipate after 
approximately one year. (Id., 3060:7-3062:11). 
. 237. The court concludes from the nature and extent of Pangburn's cross-
examination that he was well-aware of the defense theory regarding aging/freshness of 
fingerprints by February 2005. Thus, Pangburn's examination of Kerchusky was not a 
last-minute, shoot-from-the-hip situation, but it was, in accord with PangbUrn's 
testimony, to get him involved some in the scientific aspect of the case and to take some 
of the load off Rader. 
238. The court therefore concludes that the defense, through Pangburn, had a 
definite strategy regarding the fingerprints; that Pangburn was aware of this strategy 
well-ahead of his examination of Kerchusky and that he, as a matter of strategy, asked 
the questions he chose to ask of Kerchusky without asking about "freshness" per se. 
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239. Pangburn was prepared regarding the defense fingerprint theory, and he 
exercised his judgment and skill in presenting those issues to the jury. He also argued 
the freshness of the fingerprints to the jury in his closing. (See Supplemental Appeal 
Transcript, 270:11-272:25) ("You know, these things start getting a year old, and you're 
just not going to see it .... Those fingerprints had not been there for very long."). 
240. Mel Speegle, (Speegle) was the tenant in the guesthouse at the time of the 
murders. He is also the owner of the .264 rifle used to murder the Johnsons. 
241. Speegle testified at trial that: (1) he kept the rifle in his closet along with 
three other guns (IT 2702:8-2703:2); (2) the guns were not locked (id., 2703:3-8); (3) he 
saw the guns the weekend prior to the murders at which time the scope was still on the 
.264 rifle (id., p.2704:6-2706:8); (4) he had only fired the .264 three times, ten years prior 
(id., 2706:17-21); (5) he cleaned the .264 in 1993 (id., 2708:2-9); and (6) he has no idea how 
many people touched the .264 rifle, but his wife and a friend helped him move into the 
guesthouse (id., 2707:11-22). 
242. Speegle also testified that Johnson had access to his apartment, that 
Johnson knew he would be gone the weekend before the murders, and that the .264 
rifle, as well as his other guns and ammunition, were in the closet when Johnson 
cleaned his apartment and stayed there with friends. (IT 2693:17-20,2694:25-2696:6, 
2715:12-25). 
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243. Speegle and Hill also both testified at the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing before this court. Speegle testified that he moved into the guest house on the 
Johnson property in "approximately 2002." (PCHT 699:10-15). 
244. Hill helped Speegle move from his "ranch house" into the Johnson guest 
house. (Id., 700:18-20, 703:20-23). Hill was a "good mend" of Speegle's and had been a 
caretaker at Speegle's ranch house where he had access to Speelge's .264 rifle. (Id., 
p.704:1-4, 11-13, 724:10-20). To Speegle's knowledge, Hill did not have access to the 
Johnson guest house. (Id., 704:8-10). 
245. Hill confirmed that he was the caretaker for Speegle's ranch and that he 
helped Speegle move "a few things" into the Johnson guest house. (PCHT 726:14-17, 
727:5-12). Hill also confirmed that he did not have access to the guest house. (Id., 
727:13-16). 
246. Hill specifically, and credibly, denied any involvement in the murders of 
Alan and Diane, noting he did not even hear about the murders until about one week 
after they occurred because he had been camping. (Id., 728:5-20). 
247. In explaining why his prints would be on the .264 rifle, other than having 
possibly left them when he helped Speegle move, Hill testified that, during the 
springtime in 2000, while he was caretaking at Speegle's ranch, he "took [the rifle] out, 
tried to sight it," and shot it "six or seven times" using Speegle's ammunition. (PCHT 
728:21-729:7; see also 729:24-731:21). 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To the extent that any Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of 
Law, they are incorporated into these Conclusions of Law. 
2. An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. Kelly v. State, 
_ Idaho ----J 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). Like the plaintiff in any other civil 
proceeding, Johnson must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon 
which her request for post-conviction relief is based. Idaho Code § 19-4907; see also id. 
3. A preponderance of the evidence requires evidence establishing a fact as 
more probable than not. Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611,622, 80? P.2d 472, 
483 (1991); Ebert v. Neu1ton, 97 Idono 418, 546 P.2d 64 (1976); see also Big Butte Ranch Inc. 
v. Gmsmick, 91 Idaho 6, 9, 415 P.2d 48, 51 (1966) (IlfPreponderance of evidence' means 
such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and 
from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies therein."). 
ld. 
4. As the Court in Big Butte Ranch noted further: 
In the event that the evidence is evenly balanced so that the 
court is unable to say that the evidence on either side of an 
issue ... has the greater convincing force, then the court's 
finding upon that issue must be against the party who had 
the burden of proving it. 
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5. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought 
underthe post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 
1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). 
6. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Johnson must 
show that her attorney's performance was deficient and that she was prejudiced by the 
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984); 
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,224 (Ct.App.1995). 
7. To establish a deficiency, Johnson has the burden of showing that her 
attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). 
8. There is a strong presumption that trial counse1's performance falls within 
the wide range of "professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 
(1988). 
9. "In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance," the Idaho 
Supreme Court has cautioned, "judicial scrutiny must be highly deferential and every 
effort must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time.' II State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345-46, 127 P.3d 954, 
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961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323,329 (1999) and 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984»). 
10. Moreover, Idaho's appellate courts have long adhered to the proposition 
that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal 
unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law 
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL 
4483675,7 (Idaho App. 2010) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261, 
263 (Ct.App.1994». 
11. In addition, Johnson must not only show incompetence, but must also 
show that the deficient conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the proceeding cannot be relied upon as having produced a just 
result. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). 
12. Thus, Johnson's burden here is a "heavy" one. See Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). As was noted recently by the 
United States Supreme Court: 
Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task. ... 
An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to 
escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not 
presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must be 
applied with scrupulous care, lest "intrusive post-trial 
inquiry" threaten the integrity of the very adversary process 
the right to counsel is meant to serve .... 
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Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. ---J ---J 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (quoting Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. ~ ~ 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)) (citations omitted). 
13. In the end, the "question is whether an attorney's representation 
amounted to incompetence under 'prevailing professional norms,'" not whether it 
deviated from best practices or most common custom. Hatrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 
14. Johnson maintains seven claims for relief. Each will be discussed in tum. 
I. Johnson Has Failed To Meet Her Burden To Establish Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel. 
A. Johnson was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel for her attorneys' 
failing to request a continuance or adequately preparing to cross examine the state's expert, after 
learning the comforter had not been collected as evidence. 
15. Johnson has presented limited post-hearing argument regarding this 
claim; however, there was some testimony during the evidentiary hearing regarding 
this issue, which therefore merits consideration by the court. 
16. The court concludes that there is very little evidence establishing: 1) the 
claim that a continuance should have been requested; 2) Judge Wood would have 
granted the request; 3) what should have been done with the extra time if the 
continuance would have been granted; and 4) what, if any, legal arguments or expert 
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testimony could have been elicited to establish a defense or create a better presentation 
by the defense attorneys during the trial. 
17. In order to meet her burden of establishing ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Johnson is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
counsels' performance was deficient and that she was prejudiced as a result. Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 V .S. 668, 687-88 (1984). "Because of the distorting effects of 
hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a 
strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance -- that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" Davis v. State, 116 
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-
90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). 
18. It was Johnson's burden to present evidence to this court sufficient to 
overcome the strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and 
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" in 
order to establish that counsels' performance was II outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F .3d 1373, 1377 (9th 
Cir.1995) (quoting Strickland, 466 V.S. at 690). 
19. Because "[s]trategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or 
serve as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel," it was also Johnson's burden to prove that counsels' decisions were the result 
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of "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings 
capable of objective review." S tate v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373. 941 P.2d 337, 344-
345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Gabourie v. State, 
125 Idaho 254, 258, 869 P.2d 571, 575 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
20. In order to prove prejudice, Johnson is required to show that counsels' 
deficient performance actually had an adverse effect on her defense; i.e., but for 
counsels' deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 
681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
21. Regarding the second element, Johnson had the burden of showing that 
her trial counsels' deficient conduct" so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77,80,844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). 
22. When a post-conviction petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion in her underlying criminal case, the court "may consider the 
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's 
inactivity constituted incompetent performance." Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 
905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995). 
23. As with other decisions made by counsel, Johnson must overcome the 
presumption that the decision not to file a particular motion was strategic or tactical. 
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See State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991) (trial counsel's choice 
of witnesses, his manner of conducting cross-examination, and his lack of objection to 
testimony fall within the area of strategic or tactical decisions). 
24. In the underlying trial, one of the defense strategies was to attack the 
state's improper handling of evidence and sloppy investigation. (See TT:4605:5-8 
(I/[We're] going to show you where the state, first of all, ... police agencies in this case 
did a very poor job of hanging onto the evidence; of even acquiring it, to begin with.")). 
25. Thus, this court will not now second-guess that strategy and find that the 
defense should have had another strategy. 
26. Moreover, this court cannot conclude that a request for continuance on 
such vague grounds would have been granted by Judge Wood, much less that the 
continuance would have made a difference in the evidence presented or the approach 
taken at trial. 
27. It was objectively reasonable for counsel to do precisely what they did in 
this case - attack the state's failure to collect the comforter, along with other items of 
evidence the state failed to collect from the crime scene, rather than request a 
continuance on some vague, unsubstantiated basis. 
28. Therefore, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that 
her counsel were deficient in failing to request a continuance, and moreover, that she 
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suffered any prejudice as a result of the failure to request such a continuance. 
Accordingly, Johnson is not e~titled to relief on this claim and it is DENIED. 
B. Counsel were not ineffective in failing to adequately investigate the scientific 
basis for the coconut experiment, bearing on blood splatter opinion evidence. 
29. This allegation is factually disproved by the record in this case. As this 
court has found based on the facts presented, the defense attempted, although 
unsuccessfully, to create an experiment sufficiently similar to the explosion of a human 
head to be admissible at trial. No facts support the claim that counsel was unprepared 
or unschooled as to the legal standards applicable for the admission of this evidence. 
There was no proof at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, through expert 
testimony or otherwise, that there is some standard of law that Rader failed to recognize 
which otherwise would help to get an inadequate re-creation/experiment admitted. 
30. Moreover, nothing has been shown which establishes that an experiment 
better than the myriad of experiments tried by the defense even exists. In particular, 
this court has not been shown that an experiment has been conducted that: 1) would be 
admissible; and 2) Rader had access to, or should have known about during his 
preparation for and conduct of the forensic issues in the trial in 2004 and 2005. 
31. During the trial, before the defense case-in-chief, Judge Wood conducted 
an extensive hearing on the state's motion to exclude the experiment conducted by the 
defense seeking to replicate the blood spatter that would have occurred when Diane 
Johnson was shot in the head. (IT: 4291-4328; 4336-4503). 
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32. Judge Wood ruled that the experiment was inadmissible, citing forensic 
pathologist Glen Groben's testimony that there were insufficient similarities between 
the media used in the experiment and a human head. (TT 4503-4508). 
33. Judge Wood did indicate to counsel that if they desired to "try to re-
replicate th[e] test" in the "proper environment," he would "take another look at it." 
(TT 4509:17-22). 
34. Thus, the trial record belies Johnson's claims that her attorneys were 
"unable to consult with any experts." (petition, p. 8, 115.c.). Counsel had adequate time 
to consult with experts, and in fact did so, conducting a myriad of experiments with an 
array of media from Styrofoam filled with pudding to the coconut that was argued 
extensively before Judge Wood. 
35. Tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed 
unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law 
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Mendiola v. State, 2010 WL 
4483675,7 (Idaho App. 2010) (citing Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261, 
263 (Ct.App.1994)). 
36. There has been no showing here that defense counsel's efforts regarding 
the experiments were anything but strategic, or that they were based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or any other shortcoming that can be 
objectively evaluated. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW -71 
( ( 
37. Rader's belief that he could have and should have reached out to other 
professional groups or attorneys for assistance is simply second guessing and is 
precisely the sort of hindsight that is insufficient for establishing a claim of deficient 
performance. 
38. Johnson also fails to establish any prejudice regarding this claim, in that 
the defense attorneys' theme throughout the case centered on the "no blood, no guilt" 
theory and counsel presented forensic evidence for the jury's consideration, albeit short 
of the coconut experiment, to establish their theory. 
39. Simply because the jury failed to accept the defense "no blood, no guilt" 
premise is insufficient to establish that the attorneys were at fault in any way regarding 
their efforts as to the science surrounding the blood spatter and their theory of the case. 
40. Therefore Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing defective 
performance or prejudice regarding this claim and it is DENIED. 
C. Counsel were not ineffective in failing to adequately c7'Oss-examine witnesses. 
41. In claim 4(e), Johnson alleges that counsel were ineffective with respect to 
the cross-examination of Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Ellison, Walt Femling, Steve 
Harkins, Bruno Santos, Consuelo Cedeno, Glenda Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Jane Lopez, 
Becky Lopez, Carlos Ayala, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (Petition, pp.9-13, ~ 16.) 
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42. Of these fourteen witnesses, only seven were called as witnesses at the 
evidentiary hearing before this court: Walt Femling, Steve Harkins, Bruno Santos, 
Consuelo Cedeno, Jane Lopez, Raul Ornelas, and Stu Robinson. (PCHT 2-3.) 
43. Johnson failed to call Alan Dupuis, Julia Dupuis, Kjell Ellison, Glenda 
Osuno, Luis Ramirez, Becky Lopez, or Carlos Ayala and failed to present any evidence 
as to counsels' decisions regarding their examination of these witnesses, or any 
substantive evidence of how their testimony would have been different. Johnson, 
therefore, failed to meet her burden of showing counsel was ineffective in cross-
examining these witnesses. The court will discuss the remaining witnesses in turn. 
44. At the outset it is axiomatic that cross-examination of witnesses is 
generally a tactical decision. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,563, n.2, 199 P.3d 123, 138 n.2 
(2008). Judicial scrutiny of these issues "must be highly deferential and every effort 
must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time.' " State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345-46, 127 P.3d 954, 
961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323,329 (1999) and 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052,2065 (1984». 
a. Sheriff Walt Femling. 
45. In her Petition Johnson alleges trial counsel "failed to adequately cross-
examine the Blaine County Sheriff," Walt Femling who allegedly "made a statement 
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during the early stages of the investigation to the effect that it was vital that police find 
a suspect in order to prevent a negative perception of the Sun Valley area from 
outsiders who may have decided not to visit if the crime went unsolved." (petition, 
pp.10-11, ~ 16.a.iii.). 
46. The legal standard applicable to cross-examination provides that the 
scope of Rader's cross-examination is entitled to the presumption that it was sound trial 
strategy. 
47. Johnson has failed to rebut that presumption. Indeed, Johnson failed to 
even inquire of Rader regarding his strategic decisions regarding Femling's testimony, 
much less prove that the strategy was objectively unreasonable. 
48. The facts simply do not support Johnson's claim that law enforcement 
were so dead-set on convicting Johnson that they went after her to the exclusion of all 
others. 
49. As noted above, Femling testified to this court, as well as at trial, that law 
enforcement interviewed "upwards of 400 people," prepared 11,000 pages of reports, 
spent $517,000 investigating the case, collected over 400 pieces of evidence, assigned 3.5 
people to the case full-time for a year and one-half, and followed-up on all investigative 
leads. (TT 2458:4-2461:16). It also took an extended period of time, and the receipt of 
DNA evidence before the focus of the state's investigation narrowed to Sarah Johnson. 
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50. Given the similarities between Femling's trial testimony regarding the 
scope of the investigation into the Johnson murders and his testimony at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing, this court finds that such testimony is credible. 
51. Thus, Johnson has failed to prove that counsel was deficient in cross-
examining Femling regarding a theory that the facts simply do not support. Moreover, 
there is no showing that Johnson was prejudiced as a result of the allegedly inadequate 
cross-examination. 
52. Accordingly, Johnson's claim as to the cross-examination of Femling is 
DENIED. 
b. Steve Harkins. 
53. The court concludes that Pangburn's cross-examination was, again, based 
upon tactical decision-making and is not subject to second-guessing by this court. 
54. Pangburn did cross-examine Harkins' extensively regarding his 
interviews in the case with Santos' known associates, and Pangburn succeeded in 
asking about unsavory characters and Santos' drug-dealing mindset--even going so far 
as to ask whether Santos' associates would kill for him. 
55. While not every question was asked of Harkins that Johnson would now, 
in hindsight, think should have been asked, Johnson has failed to overcome the heavy 
burden that such questions and the scope of such examination are matters of trial tactics 
which are presumed to be sound trial strategy. 
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56. Johnson has also, given the scope and extent of the questions that were 
asked, failed to establish the requisite prejudice here, that but for any errors by 
Pangburn in his cross-examination of Harkins, the result would have been different. 
57. As such, Johnson has failed to overcome this presumption as to the cross-
examination of Detective Harkins. This claim is DENIED. 
c. Bruno Santos. 
58. This court has reviewed the record of the underlying trial and made 
factual findings regarding the cross-examination of Santos by Rader. 
59. Those findings set forth that Rader was very knowledgeable of Santos' 
shortcomings, and had a plan regarding the scope of his inquiry. 
60. His inquiry was largely cut short based on Judge Wood's evidentiary 
ruling regarding the propriety of the defense's intended questions. Based thereon, 
Rader indicated at the conclusion of the state's direct examination that the defense 
"decided not to enter into a stipulation and ... decided not to cross examine Mr. Santos 
... at all." (Id., 2771:11-15). 
61. This was a penultimate strategic decision made with knowledge of Santos' 
past, with full knowledge of the lack of facts tying Santos to the Johnson murders, and 
with an understanding of the legal ruling made by Judge Wood. 
62. Thus, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of proving that Rader's 
decision not to cross-examine Santos was anything but strategic or that the decision was 
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objectively unreasonable in light of the testimony Santos offered on direct and the 
limitations Judge Wood placed on cross-examination. 
63. Johnson likewise has failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the 
failure to cross-examine Santos. Santos provided no additional testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing that would have aided in Johnson's defense and there is no reason 
to conclude that cross-examination of Santos at trial would have resulted in a different 
outcome in light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence against Johnson and the 
complete absence of any evidence implicating Santos in the murders. 
64. Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing she is entitled to relief 
on her claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Santos and this 
claim is DENIED. 
d. Consuela Cedeno. 
65. 1his court has indicated that Ms. Cedeno's testimony at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing was essentially valueless. 
66. The court has concluded as a finding of fact that it cannot conclude that 
Pangburn simply passed off the cross-examination of this witness to Rader at the last 
minute. 
67. The presumption therefore remains that the failure to cross-examine 
Cedeno was a strategic decision and Johnson has not overcome the presumption in that 
regard. 
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68. Moreover, even if the decision was inept and fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, this court cannot find prejudice regarding the issues which 
Johnson now contends should have been asked on cross-examination. 
69. The court has concluded that Dunn's information regarding their being no 
dew on the morning of September 3 is an unsupported fact, based upon the testimony 
of Officer Cornelas. See supra, £n. 8. Moreover, the fact that Santos may have "run 
around," or that Cedeno may have told differing stories regarding the odometer on the 
family car is, in light of the entire record and the overwhelming evidence against 
Johnson, inconsequential. 'These facts simply would not have made a difference in this 
case, and there is no prejudice to Johnson based on counsel's failure to inquire about 
them. 
70. Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing she is entitled to relief 
on her claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Cedeno and this 
claim is DENIED. 
e. lane Lopez. 
71. This court has reviewed the entirety of the record as it pertains to the 
issues raised as to the cross-examination of Jane Lopez. 'The court has further 
concluded that the phone records which purportedly create a discrepancy actually do 
not. 
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72. Therefore, the presumption that Rader's questioning, limited though it 
was, was simply strategic has not been overcome in this case. 
73. Johnson has failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel's decision 
regarding the cross-examination of Ms. Lopez was anything but strategic, much less 
that it was deficient, and she has failed to establish any prejudice resulting from Rader's 
failure to try and impeach Ms. Lopez with the phone records. Indeed, Johnson did not 
even attempt to do so at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 
74. Consequently, Johnson cannot demonstrate how any such impeachment 
would have made a difference in the outcome of this case, particularly where the court 
has made a factual determination that the records do not impeach Lopez. 
75. Because Johnson has failed to meet her burden of showing counsel was 
ineffective in his cross-examination of Ms. Lopez, this claim is hereby DENIED. 
f. Raul Ornelas. 
76. The court has made factual findings that establish: 1) that Tim Richards 
never testified to having walked in the back yard at the Johnson home before officers 
arrived at the scene; and 2) Officer Raul Ornelas did not testify that the footprints were 
made by more than one person; rather, he specifically testified that he could not tell. 
77. Pangburn's cross-examination of Ornelas was thus based upon the record 
and the scope of Ornelas' direct testimony. Johnson has failed to prove Pangburn's 
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efforts were either deficient or prejudicial for his failure to "point out" or "highlight" 
information that was not actually in evidence. 
78. Moreover, Johnson failed to offer any evidence, let alone prove that 
Pangburn's cross-examination of Officer Ornelas was anything but tactical. Johnson's 
claim regarding the cross-examination of Ornelas is therefore DENIED. 
G. Stuart Robinson. 
79. The court has made factual findings establishing that Stuart Robinson's 
testimony before the grand jury was not inaccurate at the time it was made; the 
fingerprints, though recovered at that time, were not identified. 
80. Thus, Rader's failure to impeach Robinson with that information is a non-
issue. There was no impeachment to be had regarding that statement. 
81. Even if there is some limited value from information Johnson elicited from 
Robinson at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, that value comes nowhere close to 
establishing Johnson's burden to show that "but for counsels' deficient performance, 
there [is J a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
82. Thus, this court concludes that Johnson has established neither deficient 
performance nor prejudice regarding the cross-examination of Stuart Robinson. This 
portion of Johnson's claim is therefore DENIED. 
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D. Defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to present evidence of an audio recording, 
recorded inadvertently by Trooper Ross Kirtley. 
83. In this claim Johnson alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to present 
evidence of an audio recording that allegedly illustrates the police "focused" on 
Johnson "to the exclusion of all other possible suspects and theories, because Uohnson] 
was the easiest target." (Petition, p.13, 'If 16.c.). 
84. The recording to which Johnson refers was a recording from Trooper 
Kirtley's microphone and dashboard camera, which recorded from before he was 
dispatched to the crime scene to approximately two and one-half hours later, when he 
was still at the scene. (Exhibit 12). 
85. Given the entirety of the record herein, and the court's factual findings 
regarding the lack of a "focus" on Johnson to the exclusion of others, see Findings of 
Fact, 'If'lf 126-134, this court concludes that counsel were not ineffective for failing to 
admit the recording. 
86. The officers' initial thoughts, while of some interest9, do nothing to 
undermine the record of the police investigation, which shows that there were initially 
multiple suspects, and that, in the eyes of Sheriff Femling, Johnson's status as "prime 
suspect" did not materialize until the DNA results were returned showing Johnson's 
DNA in the glove hidden in her pink robe in the garbage can. 
9 One of the initiaJ thoughts of the officers on the recording was that a murder-suicide had occurred, a theory which 
is unsupported by the evidence and which the defense did not pursue at trial. 
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87. Johnson failed to establish that the decision not to introduce such 
evidence was objectively unreasonable or that introduction of such evidence, assuming 
it could even be correctly characterized as Johnson has characterized it, would remotely 
undermine confidence in the outcome of her case. 
88. Because Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing counsel was 
ineffective for failing to introduce the entirety of Trooper Kirtley's audio, the court 
DENIES Johnson relief on this claim. 
E. Defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to inquire whether certain 
previously unidentified fingerprints were "fresh." 
89. As the court has concluded based on the record in this case, Pangburn was 
adequately prepared regarding the forensic/fingerprint testimony in the Johnson trial. 
He inquired of the state's expert regarding aging of fingerprints, and he inquired 
similarly of Mr. Kerchusky regarding the same issues. 
90. The information regarding the freshness of the prints was before the jury 
from both Pangburn's direct examination of Kerchusky, and from his cross-examination 
of Ms. Walthall. Moreover, Pangburn in fact argued that when the fingerprints /I start 
getting a year old ... you're just not going to see [them]." He also argued that the 
unknown fingerprints, which have now been identified as those of Christopher Hill 
"had not been there for very long." (Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 270:11-272:25). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 82 
91. Thus, Pangburn did not err in failing to specifically ask whether the prints 
were "fresh" or in failing to ask Kerchusky those questions which Kerchuskyanswered 
at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing regarding who, in his opinion, touched the 
scope last. 
92. The court therefore concludes that Pangburn's questions of Kerchusky at 
trial do not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court further 
concludes that Johnson has not overcome the "strong presumption that trial counsel's 
performance falls within the wide range of 'professional assistance.'" Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). 
93. 1his court further recognizes that its scrutiny must be "highly deferential 
and every effort must 'be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.'" State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345-46, 
127 P.3d 954, 961-62 (2005) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300,306,986 P.2d 323, 
329 (1999) and Strickland v. Washington, 46.6 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)). 
94. Viewing this issue from this deferential perspective, the court concludes 
that Johnson has failed to establish that Pangburn was ineffective or that she has 
suffered any prejudice from the claimed deficiengr. This claim is accordingly DENIED. 
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F. Johnson did not receive a manifestly unfair trial and unjust verdict due to the 
cumulative effect of counsel's alleged lack of diligence, failure to investigate the facts and law of 
the case, chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings. 
95. Johnson maintains that she is entitled to post-conviction relief based upon 
the cumulative effect of counsel's alleged lack of diligence, failure to investigate the 
facts and law of the case, chronic tardiness and unpreparedness for court proceedings. 
96, As is set forth above, this court has concluded that none of these 
assertions, either individually or collectively, has been proven in this case. Nothing in 
the record establishes that the defense team, or any of them, was chronically late, 
unprepared or indolent, 
97. The facts have been established that Pangburn and Rader's conduct did 
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness as to any of Jqhnson's claims," 
Consequently, she has failed to establish the cumulative error she alleges occurred in 
this case. 
98. Johnson has not cited any support in the record that the defense team was 
unaware of legal precedent or the law of the case. In fact, this court has found just the 
opposite is true, particularly as it pertains to the defense attempts to: 1) admit their 
blood spatter experiment; and 2) cross-examine Bruno Santos extensively regarding his 
history. 
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99. Therefore, the court DENIES Johnson any relief based upon the 
accumulation of alleged wrongful conduct by her attorneys. 
II. Johnson Is Not Entitled To A New Trial On The Basis Of Newly Discovered 
Evidence. 
100. Johnson seeks a new trial in this matter on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence relating to the recent identification of Christopher Hill as the source of some of 
the previously unidentified latent prints. 
101. Newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial only if Johnson 
demonstrates: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to her at the time 
of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will 
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to a 
lack of diligence on the part of the defendant. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 
P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,691,551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976». 
102. In announcing this four-part test in Drapeau, the Court cited Professor 
Wright's text on Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment, 
"after a man has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper 
reluctance to give him a second trial." 97 Idaho at 691,551 P.2d at 978 (citation 
omitted). 
103. A long line of Idaho cases have held, consistently with the Court's 
pronouncement in Drapeau, that evidence known to the defendant at the time of trial 
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cannot be considered newly discovered. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 146, 191 
P.3d at 224 (in order to be newly discovered evidence, the evidence itself, not just 
importance or materiality of that evidence, must be unknown and unavailable prior to 
trial); State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404,410,273 P.2d 97, 100 (1954) (evidence which 
defendant was aware of prior to trial but chose not to present is not newly discovered); 
State v. Morrison, 52 Idaho 99,11 P.2d 619,622 (1932) (evidence discovered during trial 
is not newly discovered); State v. Lumpkin, 31 Idaho 175, 169 P. 939, 940 (1917) (facts 
unknown at time of trial could be considered newly discovered); State v. Cook, 13 Idaho 
45,88 P. 240, 242 (1907) (concluding evidence that colts were not stolen but actually 
belonged to the rancher for which defendants worked was not newly discovered). 
104. In this case the only thing about the "newly discovered evidence" which is 
new is the identification to whom the fingerprints belong. Nevertheless, the court 
concludes that this identification meets the first prong of Drapeau because the evidence 
is newly discovered and was unknown to Johnson at the time of trial. 
105. The court also finds that the fourth Drapeau prong is met; the discovery of 
the identity of the unlcnown fingerprints had nothing to do with the defendant's 
conduct. 
106. However, Johnson has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the 
discovery that Mr. Hill's fingerprints on the .264 rifle, scope, and ammunition boxes is 
material or would likely produce an acquittal on a retrial. 
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107. At trial, the evidence of fingerprints on the murder weapon, the scope, the 
box and elsewhere was presented and dealt with extensively. (IT 2994:10-3077:25; 
5045:15-5132:15; 5808:1-5843:4; 5846:16-5858:17). 
108. The jury was aware that unidentified fingerprints were on the scope, gun, 
some of the shells, and the box containing the shells. (TT 3077:1-17). Thus, it was 
established at trial that Johnson had left no fingerprints on those items; if any of the 
prints on those items belonged to the "real killer," then the killer was not Johnson and 
was some unidentified person. 
109. Pangburn utilized this fingerprint information and argued it to the jury, to 
no avail. (See, e.g., Supplemental Appeal Transcript, 270:11-272:25) (pangburn's closing 
argument that the fingerprints on the rifle and scope had not been there very long -
implying that the "real killer" was unidentified). 
110. The jury was aware of the phantom prints, and they still convicted 
Johnson of both counts of first degree murder; thus, telling a new jury the name of the 
owner of those phantom prints will not likely produce an acquittal. 
111. Speegle and Hill both testified as to how, when and where Hill had 
touched the rifle. The fact that this information is now known makes the fingerprint 
testimony even less valuable than it was at the time of the trial, when the defense could 
argue that a nameless third party handled the gun, the shells and removed the scope. 
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112. The court recognizes that Mr. Kerchusky testified in a contradictory 
manner to this conclusion; h~ is convinced of his theory of the case, as much as the 
state's expert, Ms. Walthall is convinced that you cannot age fingerprints. 
113. This court's task is to evaluate both witnesses' testimony in light of the 
entire record before the court. In doing so, the court chooses not to accept Kerchusky's 
hypothesis. 
114. This court, as fact-finder, is not bound to accept the testimony of any 
expert witness. See Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 566, 130 P.3d 1097, 
1104 (2006) (the factfinder is free to determine the weight to be given to the testimony of 
an expert); In re Baby Boy Doe, 127 Idaho 452, 460, 902 P.2d 477,485 (1995) (the weight to 
be given to expert testimony is for the trier of fact). 
115. The court simply cannot accept the theory that Hill was the unknown 
killer in this case. Hill testified credibly that he was camping on East Magic Road at the 
time of the murders. He had no access to the guest house or to the Johnson home; he 
has no knowledge of the inner workings of the Johnson home, i.e., where knives were 
hidden, where Sarah's robe was kept, or where the key to the gun safe was located (to 
retrieve the 9mm magazine). The totality of the circumstances simply does not support 
Kerchusky's theory that Hill was the last person to touch the scope, the gun, or the 
ammunition and this court does not accept that theory. 
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116. The court also does not find it surprising that Johnson's fingerprints were 
not on the weapon, the scope, or any of the ammunition or packaging, given that a 
leather glove was found in her room in the trash can, and the matching glove was 
wrapped in Johnson's robe ready for trash pickup, along with a latex glove containing 
Johnson's DNA. 
117. Moreover, the trial jury was also instructed on the theory of aiding and 
abetting murder. Use of such instruction was affirmed on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 
145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008). 
118. While the state did not rely upon that "theory of liability" in proving its 
case, see 145 Idaho at 975, 188 P.3d at 917, the jury was free to consider that theory 
because "it was Johnson who argued that she could not have been the actual shooter." 
ld. at 977, 188 P.3d at 919. 
119. Nothing presented to this court during the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing establishes that Johnson, even if she were not the actual shooter, was not 
complicit as an aider and abettor. 
120. It is undisputed that Johnson was home at the time of the murders. There 
was no forced entry in this case, either to the Johnson home or the guesthouse; 
J OMS on' s bedroom contained .264 caliber cartridges, a 9mm magazine and a right-
handed leather glove matching the left one wrapped in J oMson' s robe in the garbage; 
both gloves belonged to Diane and were kept in the family vehicle; the knives found in 
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the guest bedroom and at the foot of the Johnsons' bed were located where an intruder 
or stranger would have difficulty finding them; Johnson had a key to the guesthouse; 
Johnson was angry with her parents because they disapproved of her relationship with 
Santos; and Johnson gave numerous conflicting stories about what she allegedly was 
doing when her parents were shot. As Judge Barry Wood viewed this evidence: 
I think it's really interesting that the brother-in-law, the 
man who had gotten married there the week before, two 
weeks before, whatever it was, that spent, he testified, four 
or five days in that very upstairs apartment in the guest 
house, and never knew the gun was there, never saw it. 
Used the closet and didn't even know the gun was there. 
Didn't know the bullets were there. 
[TJo suggest to a reasonable jury such things that 
somebody off of the street could come and find that gun in 
the guest house, find those bullets in the guest house, know 
when the parents were going to be there; find the knives in 
the kitchen that are hidden, the one knife that's hidden 
behind the microwave or bread box, whatever it was, in the 
dark, no less; go out past the family dog that the evidence 
was would bark, and the dog didn't bark. Take the same 
route that Sarah Johnson told the police she took out of the 
house, past the trash can where the robe is found. Get her 
bathrobe out of the bathroom next to her room, and not 
awaken her or bother her. 
Both doors being open, according to her experts, the 
parents' bedroom door and her bedroom door. Do all of this 
in the dark and not disturb the parents just defies common 
sense. 
I think a reasonabie jury could clearly find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Miss Johnson's involvement here. 
(Supp. Appeal Transcript, 449:1-450:4). 
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121. 'TIris court agrees with this sentiment, to the extent that Johnson must 
show that the alleged "newly discovered evidence" would produce an acquittal in 
another trial, and this court simply cannot make that leap given the above-noted facts. 
122. 'TIris court's reference to the aiding and abetting theory is not to say that 
this court is unconvinced of Johnson's direct culpability for the murder of her parents, 
as argued by the state at trial. Add to the above-noted circumstances the DNA 
evidence, Johnson's motive for the crimes, her access and her opportunity, and this 
court concludes that telling a new jury that the fingerprint owner is now identified will 
do nothing to ameliorate the mountain of evidence which the jury saw and heard in this 
case against Ms. Johnson. 
123. To quote Judge Wood again: 
The jury heard all of the evidence about the robe. The 
jury doesn't have to believe that the crime occurred exactly 
the way the defense theory is that it occurred. The argument 
of no blood, no guilt; well, the converse of that is if there's 
blood, there is guilt. And there's blood. There's blood all 
over the robe, blood on the socks. 
Your whole theory, it seems to me, the whole defense 
theory is an aiding and abetting theory, because the 
defendant's there and there's no evidence that excludes the 
defendant. There's not one piece of evidence that excludes 
the defendant from the commission of this crime that I 
heard. She's right there. And her defense -- I mean her 
defense people, Howard and Mink, testify -- and Inman, I 
believe, all three - at least two of them testified that the 
doors were open. The door to the parents' bedroom, which 
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is propped open by the pillows, and the door to Sarah 
Johnson's room is open. 
The match to the leather glove, one leather glove that was 
taken out of the Suburban, that's something else that this 
unnamed killer would have had to have known, is where the 
gloves were located, the mother's gloves in the Suburban. 
Located those in the dark, as well, and brought them into the 
house to help commit this crime. And leave one in Sarah 
Johnson's room with two cartridges for the .264; unspent, 
unfired cartridges in Sarah Johnson's room that part of her 
mother's body parts were found on; and leave those in Sarah 
Johnson's room, all while not disturbing Sarah Johnson, it 
just doesn't make sense to me. 
And I don't think it would make sense to the jury. One of 
the leather gloves found in her room, the other one found 
out -- wrapped up in the trash can inside the pink robe. 
That's what I mean by the circumstantial evidence here, and 
she admits being there. 
The evidence here is overwhelming. 
(Id., 450:4-451:19). 
124. This court adopts Judge Wood's reasoning as its own. The court has spent 
significant hours reviewing the 1000's of pages of transcripts from trial; the court has 
listened to testimony during the post-conviction hearing; the court has reviewed the 
parties' post-hearing briefing; and the court has reviewed all of this evidence against 
the legal standards set forth herein. The evidence against Ms. Johnson which exists in 
this record is, indeed, "overwhelming." 
125. Thus, the court concludes that the evidence identifying Mr. Hill's 
fingerprints is insufficient to make such evidence material, or likely to produce an 
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acquittal. As such, Johnson's claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence 
is DENIED. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this court 
hereby concludes that Johnson's Petition for Post-Conviction relief is, in all respects, 
DENIED. Counsel for the state is to prepare a judgment in conformity with this opinion 
within seven days. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
/' G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Judge 
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